NOTE 1: If convicted of only offenses committed on or after 28 December 2023, the judge shall sentence the accused in accordance with the sentencing parameters or criteria, as appropriate, or state reasons for deviating in writing. See RCM 925(c)(2), RCM 1002(a)(2), Appendices 12B (Parameter Table-Confinement Categories), 12C (Offense Category Chart), and 12D (List of Criteria Offenses), 2024 MCM.
a. MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT:
(1) $1000 or less: DD, TF, 5 years, E-1. (Category 1)
(2) Over $1000: DD, TF, 10 years, E-1. (Category 2)
b. SAMPLE SPECIFICATION:
In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board—location), on or about __________, willfully and maliciously (burn) (set fire to) (an automobile) (__________), (of some value) (of a value of more than $1000) the property of another.
c. ELEMENTS:
(1) That (state the time and place alleged), the accused (burned) (set fire to) certain property, that is: (state the property alleged), the property of another; (and)
(2) That the act was willful and malicious; [and]
[(3)] That the property was of a value of more than $1000.
d. DEFINITIONS AND OTHER INSTRUCTIONS:
An act is done “willfully” if done intentionally or on purpose.
An act is done “maliciously” if done deliberately for some mischievous purpose and without legal justification or excuse. The malice required for this offense does not have to amount to ill will or hostility. It is sufficient if a person deliberately and without legal justification or excuse burns or sets fire to the property of another.
“Property” means real or personal property of someone other than the accused.
There is no requirement that the accused specifically intend to set fire to or burn the property alleged in the specification. To satisfy the first and second elements of this offense, the accused need only willfully and maliciously start the fire that resulted in the burning or charring of the property of another alleged.
(Proof that the property was destroyed or seriously damaged is not required to establish the offense. It is sufficient if any part of the property is burned or charred. A mere scorching or discoloration caused by heat is not sufficient.)
e. REFERENCES: US v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 MJ 1 (CMA 1983); US v. Caldwell, 17 MJ 8 (CMA 1983); US v. DeSha, 23 MJ 66 (CMA 1986); US v. Banta, 26 MJ 109 (CMA 1988); US v. Crutcher, 49 MJ 236 (CAAF 1998).