

CLAMO Report

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The Judge Advocate General's School*

Introductory Note

The Center for Law and Military Operations encourages the submission of training materials, after action reviews, and legal products. The Center also welcomes the submission of articles for publication, such as this one, which concern training in an operational environment. Articles may be submitted to the Center or to *The Army Lawyer* for consideration.

Law of War and Rules of Engagement Training for the Objective Force: A Proposed Methodology for Training Role-Players

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Introduction

As the U.S. Army found itself increasingly involved in missions across the entire spectrum of military operations after the successful conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, the need for

increased performance-based training on law of war issues was identified.¹ By 1993, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee² provided enhanced scenario training to units rotating through the JRTC. These scenarios featured permanent role-players, including Army augmentees and contracted employees, who portrayed local national civilians, diplomats, and media representatives.³ Today, the JRTC employs over 100 role-players for typical combat scenarios, and over 700 role-players for Bosnian Mission Readiness Exercises.⁴

Training the role-players is vital to presenting realistic training scenarios to units undergoing law of war training. At JRTC, for example, the U.S. Army augmentees receive two to three days of training by observer-controllers (OCs) and contracted employees.⁵ The contracted role-players receive initial training when hired, and refresher training annually.⁶ While limited information regarding role-player training is available on the internet,⁷ the subject is rarely addressed in scholarly or doctrinal literature.⁸

The U.S. Army has begun its transformation⁹ to the projected Objective Force, which will include five to eight medium-weight brigade combat teams.¹⁰ These brigade combat teams will be fully deployed and ready to conduct their missions within ninety-six hours of liftoff.¹¹ By implication, any substantive law of war or rules of engagement training must therefore be completed before mission alert. Further, much of

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1. See Major Mark S. Martins, *Rules of Engagement For Land Forces: A Matter Of Training, Not Lawyering*, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1994).
 2. The JRTC is now located at Fort Polk, Louisiana.
 3. See Memorandum, JRTC Operations Group, subject: JRTC Client Update (1 Apr. 1993), available at <http://leav-150-44.army.mil/calldb.html> (Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, restricted access document RWP-11-252728).
 4. E-mail from MAJ David Heckert, Civil Affairs Planner, JRTC Operations Group, to LTC Jody Prescott, subject: Training Roleplayers (7 Mar. 2000) (on file with authors).
 5. *Id.*
 6. *Id.*
 7. See, e.g., *supra* note 2.
 8. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-101, TRAINING THE FORCE – BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING (30 Sept. 1990); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-100, TRAINING THE FORCE (15 Nov. 1988); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-4, HOW TO CONDUCT TRAINING EXERCISES (10 Sep. 1984).
 9. *Army Officially Creates Brigade Combat Teams*, NATIONAL GUARD, May 2000, at 18.
 10. See *Army Chief of Staff Discusses Vision, Transformation*, OFFICER, May 2000, at 15.
 11. Major General B. B. Bell, *Getting There from Here: The Mechanized Force Modernization Plan*, ARMOR, Jul.-Aug. 2000, at 6, Major General Joseph M. Cosumano Jr., *Transforming the Army to a Full Spectrum Force*, para. 7 (Mar. 9, 2000), available at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/transformation/data%20.../transforming_the_army_to_a_full_.html.

this training must be accomplished at home station, without the benefit of the well-developed training infrastructures of the various Combat Training Center (CTCs), like JRTC. By way of a case study which describes the manner in which role-players were trained for the permissive noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) exercise conducted by U.S. Army Alaska units as part of Northern Edge (NE) 99, this note suggests a role-player training methodology that might prove useful in such home station training as the U.S. Army transitions to the Objective Force. Northern Edge 99 was part of a continuing series of exercises designed to validate U.S. Army Alaska's ability to meet the requirements of its new Initial Entry Force (IEF) mission.

IEF Mission

On 1 July 1998, U.S. Army Alaska's 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate) (172d SIB) took on the role of U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM's) IEF. The IEF—designed for Force XXI missions that require battalion-sized or smaller forces—responds rapidly to three types of crises: humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and permissive NEOs. The three light infantry battalions of the 172d SIB share the IEF mission on a three-month rotational basis.¹² The IEF provides the USPA-COM commander with an efficient, flexible force that can be deployed rapidly throughout the USPACOM area of operations. The IEF accomplishes small contingency missions, making it unnecessary to reorganize the Division Ready Brigade (DRB) of the 25th Infantry Division (Light), in Hawaii. The DRB mission remains an ongoing requirement in U.S. Army Pacific, which mobilizes in brigade-sized elements for larger operations and sustained combat operations.¹³

The 172d SIB is uniquely qualified for the IEF mission. The 172d SIB has its own airborne infantry battalion in addition to two light infantry battalions. Furthermore, it has a field artillery battalion and a support battalion. The 172d SIB is also supported by an aviation battalion (4th Battalion, 123d Aviation Regiment, Fort Wainwright, Alaska). This unique pool of assets allows the IEF to tailor the force package to fit in a specified number of airframes and to accomplish the mission at hand.¹⁴

Northern Edge is Alaska's largest annual military training exercise. More than 10,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, coast guardsmen, and Alaska national guardsmen ordinarily take part in the joint training exercise. The major units involved include Alaskan Command, United States Army, Alaska (USARAK), U.S. Army Forces Command, Pacific Air Forces, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Forces Special Operations Command, 1st Marine Division, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Navy Alaska, U.S. Coast Guard Division 17, and the Alaska Army and Air National Guard.¹⁵ The exercise takes advantage of Alaska's rugged and varied training environment, which includes 1.5 million acres of terrain that varies from high mountains to forests to flat and rolling tundra, in temperatures that often dip below minus thirty-five degrees Fahrenheit. NE 99 was designed to employ selected component forces in a regional crisis response scenario. The scenario was based on a peace enforcement mission on the fictional island of Aragon, which was to be carried out under the terms of a United Nations mandate. NE 99 included a permissive NEO exercise to train the 172d SIB soldiers for the IEF mission. Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, conducted the NEO exercise. The 1-17 soldiers' understanding of the applicable rules of engagement (ROE) was tested by presenting the soldiers with various scenarios at each marshaling point, where purported evacuees were to be gathered.

Because of real world operational constraints, to include a lack of combat arms soldiers to act as OCs and role-players, USARAK OSJA and AG were tasked to prepare and conduct the NEO scenarios. The Special Troops Battalion at Fort Richardson provided soldiers to act as role-players. Using the eight-step training model,¹⁶ these combat service support (CSS) soldiers were quickly trained to be effective OCs and role-players in a training scenario with which they had little experience.

Eight-Step Training Model

Plan the Training

The planning for the role-player training actually began almost a year before NE 99, when the 1-501 Parachute Infantry

12. See Heike Hasenauer, *A New Response to Crisis*, SOLDIERS, Dec. 1998, at 10.

13. *Id.*; see UNITED STATES ARMY ALASKA, USARAK BATTLE BOOK ch. 1, at 3 (1998).

14. The IEF is designed to deploy in four possible air packages: light airborne, light, medium, and heavy. The two light packages fit on fourteen C141s and two C5s. The medium package adds a military police squad and a military intelligence team, and fits on sixteen C141s and two C5s. The heavy package adds a field artillery battery, an 81 mm mortar platoon, and an air defense artillery section, which fits on twenty-three C141s and two C5s. Each package includes an infantry battalion and five UH-60s with support.

15. See Specialist Joel C. Davis, *Alaska's Premier Joint Training Exercise Kicks Off*, ARMY LINKNEWS, ¶ 5 (Mar. 4 1999), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Mar1999/a19990304ne'99.html>.

16. The eight-step training model is designed to produce realistic, challenging, and well-executed training. The eight steps are: (1) plan the training; (2) train and certify leaders; (3) reconnoiter the training site; (4) issue the plan; (5) rehearse; (6) execute; (7) conduct after action reviews; and (8) retrain. See Memorandum, Commander, United States Army Alaska, APVR-RPTM-TN, subject: U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) Eight Step Training Model (5 Jan. 1999).

Regiment (PIR), one of the 172d SIB's light infantry battalions, conducted a NEO exercise, *Arctic Gold*, in April 1998. OSJA personnel helped devise the scenarios that tested the ability of soldiers to deal with civilians on the field of operations, and also served as OCs. In August 1998, the 1-501 PIR conducted a similar NEO exercise, *Black Tiger/Geronimo Strike*, which was an airborne insertion exercise conducted in Thailand with Thai paratroopers. The 1-501 PIR participated in the exercise after having flown non-stop from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska,¹⁷ and OSJA personnel served as scenario planners and OCs during the exercise.

Through these exercises, the 1-501 PIR and OSJA personnel built a significant knowledge base to develop effective training methods for conducting a NEO in the IEF context. OSJA personnel interviewed 1-501 soldiers and officers to identify training deficiencies and areas for improvement in previous exercises. Four junior enlisted soldiers from each company, all of whom participated in both NEO exercises, were interviewed together as a group. Company commanders, executive officers, and first sergeants from two of the 1-501 PIR companies were interviewed separately. The interviews identified two primary training deficiencies. First, the soldiers wanted more practice in situations calling for the use of less-than-lethal force and determining hostile intent. Second, to provide more realistic scenarios, role-players needed to have a better understanding of the "big picture" of the operation, and how their respective scenarios fit into the overall concept of the operation so that they did not overplay their roles.

With these two training objectives in mind, the OSJA scenario planners contacted CLAMO and U.S. Southern European Task Force,¹⁸ which has a mission similar to IEF, for NEO scenario materials and advice. With this information, the scenarios from exercises *Arctic Gold* and *Black Tiger/Geronimo Strike* were refined to incorporate more elements of "friction"¹⁹ that would allow IEF soldiers to refine their NEO skills. A draft master scenario event list (MSEL) was compiled and approved by the NE 99 exercise director.²⁰ Once approved, the MSEL served as a touchstone to develop an effective training schedule and corresponding training products for the role-players.

17. See Hasenauer, *supra* note 10.

18. U.S. Southern European Task Force (SETAF) is based in Vicenza, Italy. For an overview of SETAF's mission, see Kevin Stringer, *Interview with MG E.P. Smith*, 28 JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY INTERVIEWS 19 (Nov. 12, 1997), available at <http://www.janes.com/defense/interviews/971112.html>.

19. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, *ON WAR* (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. and trans., 1976).

Peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the real thing, but even they can give an army an advantage over others whose training is confined to routine, mechanical drill. To plan maneuvers so that some of the elements of friction are involved, which will train officers' judgment, common sense and resolution is far more worthwhile than inexperienced people might think.

Id. at 122.

20. The Appendix to this note provides the final MSEL. See Center for Law and Military Operations, *CLAMO Databases*, at <http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/CLAMO> (last modified Aug. 30, 2000) (Training, Training Programs, Role Player Training-Northern Edge 99, DunlapPrescottappendix.doc).

Train and Certify Trainers and Leaders

USARAK OSJA and AG personnel served as the primary trainers for the role players. These trainers relied upon their past training, career experiences, relevant doctrine, and information gathered from the two previous exercises to establish a base level of competence that role-players had to attain. This was necessary given the novel IEF mission and the lack of an established cadre of OCs and role-players within U.S. Army Alaska. Because the primary focus of the NEO exercise would be scenarios emphasizing the use of non-lethal force rather than combat techniques, the lack of formal training for the primary leaders and trainers was not a significant drawback. Formal training in cold weather operations, however, was a necessity for all exercise participants. Because temperatures could reach -35 degrees Fahrenheit during the exercise, all OCs and role-players were required to undergo cold weather training.

Reconnoiter the Training Site

The NE 99 NEO was to take place in the cantonment area at Fort Greely, Alaska, which is over three hundred miles north of Fort Richardson. Although the distance prohibited most OCs from reconnoitering the training site prior to the training, the primary trainers flew to Fort Greely to determine which sites and what resources were available at the different training locations. The trainers selected primary marshaling points based on the factors of landing zone access, shelter for role-players, and distance from other marshaling points. These factors could only be assessed by an on-site inspection.

Issue Training Plans

Two months prior to NE 99, the OCs and role-players were briefed on the NE 99 NEO concept by the primary trainers. Training packets issued to the OCs and role-players contained the individual OC and role-player assignments. Scripts for each scenario were prepared to identify marshaling point locations, provide an overview of each scenario, and outline the role-players' anticipated actions. These scripts were based on the draft MSEL. The OCs and role-players were also given a draft exercise ROE that had been tailored for a NEO in a per-

missive environment. Finally, the OCs and role-players were briefed on the two primary training themes for the operation: providing 172d SIB soldiers challenging and realistic training scenarios which could be successfully resolved through the use of non-lethal force; and providing realistic scenarios by ensuring that OCs and role-players understood how the entire NEO exercise would work, and how their individual pieces of the NEO fit into the whole exercise.²¹

Conduct Rehearsals

After the initial briefing by the primary trainers, the OCs and role-players began a series of weekly rehearsals. Role-players were briefed on the content of each of the scenarios, and emphasis was placed on a thorough understanding of the underlying Law of War and ROE principles that were being probed in each scenario. To provide more training scenarios requiring the use of non-lethal force, the training concept allowed the role-players to push the soldiers into responding, but without those role players demonstrating hostile acts or hostile intent. This would force the soldiers to think about necessary force and non-lethal measures that could resolve the situation.²² The weekly rehearsals taught the role-players to be prepared for the various responses they might encounter. The ROE training also gave them greater ability to improvise and adapt if the scenario took an unexpected turn. No textbook answers were given. The role-players were told that a variety of responses might be acceptable under the ROE.

To enhance training, the role-players performed as soldiers executing the NEO, while the primary trainers played the role-players' parts. This allowed the role-players to see an example of how the primary leaders expected the scenarios to be played out. As in the initial ROE training, emphasis was placed on flexibility in the role-players' responses. Each of the scenarios was rehearsed in front of all OCs and role-players. This allowed for accelerated training as role-players observed other role-players encounter differing reactions by the trainers. This phase of training also gave the CSS soldiers an opportunity to experience the difficulties faced by infantry soldiers that perform NEO missions. The role-players developed an appreciation for the difficulty of balancing security and mission requirements with ROE use-of-force considerations in MOOTW situations.

In the next phase of rehearsals, the role-players performed their roles while the primary trainers and OCs acted as soldiers performing the NEO mission. This was the first time that the role-players performed their roles; the previous rehearsals simply familiarized the role-players with the scenarios, and prepared them to play their roles effectively. The phases of

rehearsal progressed in a way that made the role-players less anxious about playing their parts, since they had already seen others play the parts. This encouraged the role-players to give motivated and confident performances. Further, training products and props were used during all rehearsal phases. This allowed the role-players to feel comfortable with the props during the actual NEO. Following the rehearsals, the group critiqued each other's performance and asked questions to clarify lessons learned.

The final briefings and rehearsals were conducted on-site at Fort Greely. In the briefings, all participants were reminded of cold weather and helicopter safety rules, and given the final coordinating instructions to ensure their safe return to the exercise control center upon completion of the exercise. Everyone also received the final MESL and an annotated map of the exercise area. The OC and role-player teams then conducted their final rehearsals at their respective scenario sites during the morning and afternoon before the NEO exercise.

Execute the Training

After the final rehearsals, OCs and role-players reassembled at the exercise control center for a final safety briefing and risk assessment.²³ The NE 99 exercise director approved the safety measures taken and the scenario director's determination that risk was moderate. The OC-role-player teams then moved out to their respective NEO scenario marshaling sites. Each of the five marshaling points had access to either defense signal network communication or a radio, which allowed them to contact the exercise control center. Furthermore, five vehicles were prepositioned at the different marshaling points for use as emergency transportation.

Beginning at 2100 5 March 1999, units of the 1-17 Infantry Regiment began an air assault insertion into the Fort Greely cantonment area from the Initial Staging Base (ISB) at Donnelly Drop Zone. As the 1-17 soldiers proceeded to each of the marshaling points, they encountered both "passive" role-players portraying U.S. citizens awaiting evacuation and the "active" role-players presenting ROE scenarios. The 1-17 soldiers successfully identified all of the role-players to be evacuated and moved them to the landing zones. The passive role-players were evacuated back to the Donnelly Drop Zone ISB by helicopter, and then transported the next morning by C-130s to the evacuee control center (ECC) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. The 1-17 soldiers handled each of their ROE scenarios successfully.²⁴ When practicable during execution, OCs questioned 1-17 soldiers about their understanding of the ROE as they applied to the scenario. This allowed the OCs to not only

21. See Major James Larsen, *Achieving Unity of Purpose: Cascading and Nesting Concepts*, INFANTRY, Sept.-Dec. 1998, at 27-28.

22. See Sergeant First Class John Williams, *A Graduated Response in Military Operations Other Than War*, NEWS FROM THE FRONT, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 3-6.

23. See U.S. ARMY ALASKA, PAM. 385-4, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS (31 July 1996).

observe the soldiers' reactions, but also to understand why the soldiers reacted as they did.

Conduct After Action Reviews

OCs and role-players were debriefed immediately upon return to the exercise control center for safety purposes. A detailed after action review (AAR) was not conducted until the OCs and role-players had arrived at the ECC at Fort Wainwright the next morning. The lead OCs led a discussion with the other OCs and role-players which addressed the following questions for each scenario:

1. How did the scenario play out?
2. Did the soldiers act according to the ROE?
3. Did the soldiers employ particular tactics or methods to keep situations from escalating toward the use of lethal force?
4. What could be done to improve the scenario for the next exercise?

The lead OCs then compiled a written report based on the AAR for their respective scenarios. These reports were combined into a single report for the U.S. Army Alaska AAR for the entire NE 99 exercise.

The lessons learned from NE 99 were immediately incorporated for future training. NE 00, conducted during 28 February through 10 March 2000, increased the realism of the training by having the marshalling sites scattered across the breadth of

Alaska. Two of 172d SIB's battalions, 1-501 PIR and 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, conducted two separate NEO missions in an environment that ranged from uncertain to hostile. Further, the number of role-players was increased to 450. Lessons learned from NE 99 were incorporated into the training of role-players and OCs for NE 00, and returning primary trainers enhanced continuity in the training program.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army has concluded that the best way to train for military missions across the spectrum of operations is to continue to focus on high-intensity conflict.²⁵ In large part, it is the discipline, confidence, and expertise instilled through this kind of training that allows soldiers to deal effectively with the wide range of situations encountered in these sorts of military operations.²⁶ As evidenced recently by the experiences of the ground forces in Kosovo,²⁷ however, U.S. Army soldiers can expect to be deployed in situations where they must be able to deal with civilians on the field of operations across the entire use-of-force spectrum. Home station training using role-players portraying civilians can provide effective training in a timely manner, and can provide it at a relatively low cost. However, installations which lack the robust training infrastructure associated with the CTCs may find that role-players trained on an ad hoc basis do not provide the realism and depth necessary for challenging training that simulates civilians on the battlefield. The steps described in this note, based on the eight-step training model, suggest a methodology for training home station role-players quickly and effectively.

24. Prior to NE 99, the unit conducted home station training on the law of war and the legal aspects of NEOs. This training contributed greatly to the soldiers' successful handling of the NEO scenarios.

25. See Louis Caldera & General Dennis J. Reimer, *A Statement on the Posture of The United States Army Fiscal Year 2000*, 22-28 (Feb. 1999), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/index.html>; see also General John Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now—A Military Strategy For A New Era*, 5 (Aug. 1999), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/index.html>.

26. See Major General S. L. Arnold & Major David T. Stahl, *A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War*, PARAMETERS 4 (Winter 1993-94).

27. See, e.g., *Ethnic Albanians, Peacekeepers Exchange Gunfire*, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 13, 1999, at A20; Matthew Kaminski, *GIs Act As Mayors Of Towns, Plan Trash Pickups In Kosovo*, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 13, 1999, at A9.