

Book Reviews

THE BEDFORD BOYS: ONE AMERICAN TOWN'S ULTIMATE D-DAY SACRIFICE¹

REVIEWED BY MAJOR JOHN G. BAKER²

*Dear Mother, I know your worries. This is an awful fight.
To lose my only twin brother and suffer the rest of my life.
Now fellas, take my warning. Believe it from start to end.
If you ever have a twin brother, don't go to battle with him.*³

The historical facts are legendary—on 6 June 1944, the Soldiers of Company A, 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Division were in the first wave of allied troops to hit Omaha Beach in Normandy.⁴ Thirty-four of the Soldiers assigned to Company A were from the rural town of Bedford, Virginia.⁵ By day's end, nineteen of these brave men died storming the beach,⁶ another three died in the days that followed.⁷ Alex Kershaw's *The Bedford Boys* is a written memorial to these boys from Bedford and the people they left behind.

The Bedford Boys is a worthy read. Kershaw uses powerful, personal observations from and about the people of Bedford to give a new twist to the very well-documented history of D-Day. These moving interviews separate Kershaw's work from other D-Day oral histories, such as Stephen Ambrose's *D-Day*⁸ and Russell Miller's *Nothing Less Than Victory*.⁹ This review outlines the story of Company A, discusses the book's strengths and weaknesses, and concludes by recommending *The Bedford Boys* to the reader.

Kershaw paints a vivid picture of life in Bedford prior to the war. Bedford was a small, rural town of three thousand, located near Virginia's Blue Ridge Mountains. In the 1930s, money was short so many joined Company A for the "dollar-a-day" they received while training to help supplement their primary income.¹⁰ Those serving with Company A did not see this reserve duty as combat training, but instead, looked at their training time as a chance to "play soldier" with their friends.¹¹ Kershaw portrays the peace time nature of the Company A's pre-war training¹² and provides insight into the anticipation the men and their families felt when it became clear that Company A would be called into federal duty.¹³ *The Bedford Boys* explains how the focus of training changed once the unit was activated before Company A headed overseas. Upon arrival in England, the training continued for eighteen long months.¹⁴ The men grew frustrated as they spent their first eighteen months training in England, while other units headed off to war.¹⁵

These long months of training were a prelude to D-Day. Kershaw's interviews with Roy Stevens, Ray Nance, Bob Slaughter and other D-Day survivors provide a terrifying, yet awe-inspiring, image of the hours leading up to D-Day, as the

¹ ALEX KERSHAW, *THE BEDFORD BOYS: ONE AMERICAN TOWN'S ULTIMATE D-DAY SACRIFICE* (2003).

² U.S. Marine Corps. Written while assigned as a student, 53d Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.

³ KERSHAW, *supra* note 1, at 187 (quoting Roy Stevens in a poem he sent to his mother telling her that his twin brother had died on D-Day).

⁴ *See id.* at 1.

⁵ *See id.*

⁶ *See id.* at 174.

⁷ *See id.* at 208.

⁸ STEPHEN AMBROSE, *D-DAY JUNE 6, 1944: THE CLIMATIC BATTLE OF WORLD WAR II* (1994).

⁹ RUSSELL MILLER, *NOTHING LESS THAN VICTORY—THE ORAL HISTORY OF D-DAY* (1993).

¹⁰ *See* KERSHAW, *supra* note 1, at 7.

¹¹ *See id.*

¹² *See id.* at 10.

¹³ *See id.* at 17.

¹⁴ *See id.* at 27.

¹⁵ *See id.* at 79.

landing crafts headed away from their ships and hit the fateful shores of Omaha Beach.¹⁶ The survivors describe the carnage at Dog Green that took the lives of nineteen of Bedford's sons.¹⁷ The interviews tell the tale of the seemingly needless deaths caused by Soldiers overloaded with gear and of the horror of watching a fellow soldier drown.¹⁸ Kershaw relates the heroics of men such as medic Cecil Breeden¹⁹ and Brigadier General Norman Cota²⁰ as the assault progresses. Perhaps the most moving portion of the book's D-Day section is Roy Stevens's description of scraping the mud from a dog tag on a temporary grave a week after D-Day and seeing his twin brother's name emerge underneath.²¹ Through his many hours of interviews with Stevens, Kershaw does an excellent job of describing the survivor's guilt Stevens felt that day and which followed him throughout his life.²² The personal accounts from surviving veterans, describing the wounds they suffered and their memories of watching their friends die, make the book worth reading.

Kershaw does not let the reader forget that war causes significant stresses on the home front as well. On 6 June 1944, radio accounts informed Bedford's citizens that the invasion of France had begun.²³ For the next several weeks, the news reports informed the people of Bedford that the cost of the invasion was high, but told nothing specific about Company A.²⁴ Apprehension began to build when some letters sent to their Soldiers were returned home in early July.²⁵

On 17 July 1944, life in Bedford changed forever when the local telegraph operator turned on her machine and saw the words, "[w]e have casualties," print across the paper.²⁶ Prior to this day, there was normally about one telegram a week announcing a Bedford war death.²⁷ As the machine printed telegraph after telegraph, it became clear "that something terrible had happened to Company A."²⁸ In all, nine telegrams came that fateful day.²⁹

Kershaw shares the heart-wrenching stories of families being notified about the deaths of so many of Bedford's sons, fathers, and husbands. There was no common reaction to the news, although the local paper assisted many in sharing their grief by publishing letters and memorials to the fallen Soldiers in the days and weeks that followed. A good example is a poem written by Mrs. J.S. Hoback, who lost her sons Bedford and Raymond on D-Day:

Do not say my sons are dead;
They only sleepest . . .
They loved each other, stayed together
And with their comrades crossed together
To that great beyond;
So weep not, mothers,
Your sons are happy and free . . .³⁰

Kershaw explains that many families, such as the Hobacks, remained outwardly stoic, but suffered greatly when outside the public eye.³¹

¹⁶ *See id.* at 121-28.

¹⁷ *See id.* at 129-37.

¹⁸ *See id.* at 125.

¹⁹ *See id.* at 152-54.

²⁰ *See id.* at 155.

²¹ *See id.* at 174.

²² *See id.* at 216-21.

²³ *See id.* at 165.

²⁴ *See id.* at 190.

²⁵ *See id.* at 191.

²⁶ *See id.* at 199.

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ *See id.* at 205.

³⁰ *Id.* at 207.

As the war comes to an end, Kershaw describes the difficulty that some families of the fallen had when they saw surviving Soldiers come back to Bedford.³² Kershaw tells of the guilt that racked the few Company A men who survived D-Day and the difficulty this guilt caused many of them.³³ Company A's sole surviving officer, Ray Nance, would lie awake at night and ask himself what more he could have done to save the men under his command.³⁴ Another survivor quickly turned to alcohol to "tr[y] to forget, wash the memories away . . . [b]ut [he couldn't]. As soon as that whiskey drie[d] out it all [came] right back."³⁵ The struggle of these survivors was not lost on their family members. As one survivor's sister explained "[p]eople say the men who died on the beach were the heroes. I think the heroes are the ones who came back and had to live with it for the rest of their lives."³⁶

The survivors took pains to remember their fallen comrades in the years after coming home. Ray Nance, in particular, worked to ensure the sacrifice of Company A would not be forgotten.³⁷ In the 1948, Nance oversaw the re-formation of Company A, which had been disbanded after the war.³⁸ Ten years later, Nance was instrumental in getting a permanent monument to Bedford's fallen built in town.³⁹

Kershaw concludes by fast forwarding fifty years and addressing the attention surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day. Kershaw shares stories of the trips different groups of survivors have taken back to the beaches of Normandy and the memories these trips re-kindled.⁴⁰ Finally, he explains the successful effort to locate the National D-Day Memorial in Bedford as a means of honoring the sacrifice Bedford made on Omaha Beach.⁴¹

The main strength of *The Bedford Boys* is Kershaw's use of the personal accounts elicited during the course of his research for the book. Kershaw conducted over thirty interviews with the survivors and their families.⁴² It is not the number of interviews that is impressive, but instead it is the impact the interviews had on these families that makes *The Bedford Boys* such a compelling read. The act of telling their stories to Kershaw affected the survivors deeply, causing some "eighty-year-old men" to cry as they relived their memories.⁴³ Kershaw's research touched these men and their families greatly. They sent Kershaw letters to assist him in his research,⁴⁴ shared clippings from their scrapbooks,⁴⁵ and provided copies of letters sent home during the war.⁴⁶

The Bedford Boys is a relevant story today. The United States recently observed the third anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks; the country continues to regularly hear of the one thousand plus service members who have died in Iraq. *The Bedford Boys* gives the families involved a sense of how to cope with a tragic loss. As stop-loss policies and involuntary extensions on active duty are announced, the affected service members can look at the citizen soldiers from

³¹ See *id.* at 208.

³² See *id.* at 218.

³³ See *id.* at 215-18.

³⁴ See *id.* at 215.

³⁵ *Id.* at 216.

³⁶ *Id.* at 217.

³⁷ See *id.* at 225.

³⁸ See *id.* Company A's long heritage continues today. On 4 March 2004, the men from Company A, who had recently been called to active duty to deploy to the Persian Gulf, marched through Bedford to the National D-Day Memorial, in memory of their predecessors who died on Omaha Beach. See John Cramer, *Bedford Bids Its Boys Farewell*, ROANOKE TIMES (Va.), Mar. 4, 2004, at 1.

³⁹ See KERSHAW, *supra* note 1, at 225.

⁴⁰ See *id.* at 230-31.

⁴¹ See *id.* at 233-34.

⁴² See *id.* at 243-62.

⁴³ See *id.* at 275.

⁴⁴ See *id.* at 9 n.6.

⁴⁵ See *id.* at 45 n.11.

⁴⁶ See *id.* at 46 n.15.

Bedford as an example of how to proudly serve their nations in a time of war. As policy makers and combatant commanders decide where and when to engage the enemy, they should consider *The Bedford Boys* in order to gain an appreciation for the human cost of war. In short, Kershaw's work is not simply a book of memories, but a relevant story with guidance that all can appreciate.

The Bedford Boys is not without flaws. One of the book's primary weaknesses is the scope of the project. While a group biography about the members of Company A provides Kershaw with a unique twist on D-Day, he does not fully take advantage of this opportunity to introduce enough of the boys from Bedford. Kershaw cuts many corners to provide his memorial to the people of Bedford in two hundred and forty pages of text. Although he does an excellent job of introducing the reader to his main characters, Kershaw often rattles off too many names in too little space.⁴⁷ This rapid fire name throwing is overwhelming and causes the reader to constantly flip back through the book to figure out who is who. As one critic explained in making a similar point, "[t]oo many men are as blurred in print as their faces are in the photo insert."⁴⁸

Further exacerbating Kershaw's rapid fire name throwing is his tendency to waste precious pages on seemingly unimportant details. For example, he devotes an entire chapter to the ship ride across the Atlantic, yet provides little information about life on the home front for the families from the time of mobilization until the days following D-Day. In another part of the book, one learns more about the 116th Regimental baseball team, the "116 Yankees,"⁴⁹ than one does about the 116th command structure during the training for the D-Day invasion. Similarly, Kershaw spends several pages discussing Eisenhower's decision to postpone the invasion of Normandy.⁵⁰ While this is an intriguing topic, this discussion simply did not fit with the flow of *The Bedford Boys*. Finally, near the end of the book, Kershaw detracts from his focus yet again when he describes the fraud investigation and subsequent bankruptcy of the National D-Day Foundation.⁵¹ Readers would have been better served had Kershaw ignored these tangential issues and spent more time focusing on developing the personal histories of the Bedford boys.

Despite these flaws, *The Bedford Boys* is worth reading. Kershaw has written a fitting memorial for the men of Company A and their families. Sixty years have passed since D-Day, and World War II veterans are entering the final stages of their lives. Less than two hundred of the five thousand men who stormed the beach at Normandy with the 116th Regiment are alive today,⁵² and "[s]oon no one will be left to tell what it was like to be on Omaha Beach."⁵³ Through *The Bedford Boys*, Bedford's story of D-Day, etched in the blood-spattered sand at Dog Green on Omaha Beach, will be preserved for future generations.

⁴⁷ For an example of a better World War II group biography, see HAROLD P. LEINBAUGHT & JOHN D. CAMPBELL, *THE MEN OF COMPANY K: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A WORLD WAR II RIFLE COMPANY* (1985).

⁴⁸ David P. Colley, *The First Casualties*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at 24.

⁴⁹ KERSHAW, *supra* note 1, at 69-71.

⁵⁰ *See id.* at 112-17.

⁵¹ *See id.* at 235.

⁵² *See id.* at 236.

⁵³ *Id.*

IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR¹

REVIEWED BY CAPTAIN BRIAN C. BALDRATE²

Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote. — President George W. Bush³

Only when U.S. leaders stop believing and preaching that bin Laden and his allies are attacking us for what we are and what we think, and instead clearly state they are attacking us for what we do, can we put aside our ill-advised and hallucinatory crusade for democracy.⁴

I. Introduction

Everyone reading *Imperial Hubris* will agree on one point, and perhaps only one point: *Imperial Hubris* is a bold and provocative work. This is especially true, because it is written by a senior intelligence officer in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),⁵ not by an outside critic or a detached academic. Yet, *Imperial Hubris* should not be read because of its courageousness (or, some might argue, imprudence). Rather, military officers should read *Imperial Hubris*, because it offers brilliant insight into the Islamic mindset and offers persuasive analysis of how America is faring in the current war on terrorism. While *Imperial Hubris* is a fascinating and compelling work, it is also intemperate, disingenuous, and in many instances, outright foolish. Despite these weaknesses, *Imperial Hubris* is essential reading for anyone who truly wants to understand the complex issues facing America in its fight with Islamic terrorism in the twenty-first century.

II. The Good

Imperial Hubris begins with a clear, direct thesis that goes against the political conventional wisdom: contrary to popular belief, Osama bin Laden and his followers are not attacking America for what America is, or what America thinks, but instead for what America does.⁶ Accordingly, defeating al Qaeda and winning the war on terror requires Americans to understand that American policy decisions, *not* American values, are fueling anti-American sentiment and increasing support for al Qaeda throughout the Muslim world.⁷ From this controversial starting point, Scheuer offers a thought-provoking argument that America's failure to understand al Qaeda is causing America to lose the war on terror.

Imperial Hubris argues that American leaders do not understand who al Qaeda is or what al Qaeda wants. While government officials continue to portray bin Laden and al Qaeda as fanatical terrorists bent on destroying America, many Muslims see bin Laden as a devout, brilliant, and heroic leader.⁸ In fact, Scheuer maintains that bin Laden is "the most

¹ ANONYMOUS, *IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR* (2004).

² U.S. Army. Written while assigned as a student, 53d Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.

³ President Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), available at <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript> (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).

⁴ ANONYMOUS, *supra* note 1, at 207.

⁵ Published under the name of Anonymous, *Imperial Hubris* describes the author as "a senior U.S. intelligence official with nearly two decades of experience in national security issues related to Afghanistan and South Asia." *Id.* at 309. The book maintained that "the author remains anonymous as the condition for securing his employer's permission to publish *Imperial Hubris*." *Id.* Subsequently, a periodical revealed the author's identity as Michael Scheuer, the head of the CIA unit charged with tracking Osama Bin Laden from 1996 to 1999. See Jason Vest, *The Secret History of Anonymous*, BOSTON PHOENIX (June 30, 2004), available at http://www.boston/news_features/other_stories/multipage/documents/03949394.asp. Mr. Scheuer resigned on 15 November 2004, after clashing with the newly appointed head of the CIA, Porter Goss. After resigning, Mr. Scheuer went public in several media interviews admitting to writing the book and stating that he resigned because he "concluded that there has not been adequate national debate over the nature of the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and the force he leads and inspires, and the nature of the intelligence reform needed to address that threat." Dana Priest, *Former Chief of CIA's Bin Laden Unit Leaves*, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2004, at A4; see also *Author of Terrorism Book Quits C.I.A.*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, at A2.

⁶ See ANONYMOUS, *supra* note 1, at xviii ("Bin Laden is out to drastically alter U.S. and Western policies toward the Islamic world, not necessarily to destroy America.").

⁷ See *id.* at 166-67. Specifically, the author cites to a Pew Trust Poll showing that Muslims favor some democratic values and concluding, "hostility is toward American policies, not American values." See *id.* at 167 (citing Susan Page, *Foreign Distrust of U.S. Increases*, USA TODAY, June 4, 2003, at 1).

⁸ See *id.* at 105-15 (comparing the "Western journalists, historians, 'experts,' editorialists, pundits, politicians, and government officials" who negatively portray bin Laden with the "Muslim journalists, columnists, and scholars" who have long recognized bin Laden's appeal).

respected, loved, romanticized, charismatic, and perhaps, able figure in the last 150 years.”⁹ Perhaps years of study have drawn Scheuer to bin Laden and colored his analysis. Regardless of any apparent bias, Scheuer provides compelling evidence substantiating his assertion that bin Laden is greatly admired throughout the Muslim world.¹⁰ From this background, Scheuer details how Saudi-backed education programs, along with expanded use of the Internet, have transformed al Qaeda from a small local following to a flourishing international Islamic insurgency.¹¹ His assessment of al Qaeda as a growing global insurgency is in stark contrast to the statements of other government officials.¹²

Scheuer argues that America is not only ignorant of who al Qaeda is, but also of what it is al Qaeda is actually trying to accomplish. According to Scheuer al Qaeda is not aspiring for an Armageddon-like battle that will destroy America.¹³ Instead, al Qaeda is fighting a precise, limited war aimed at directly overturning specific U.S. policies in the Middle East—policies that many Muslims believe are damaging the Islamic world.¹⁴ Specifically, Scheuer points to America’s massive support for Israel, her continued military presence in the Middle East, and her protection of corrupt, repressive tyrannies like Saudi Arabia in order to secure inexpensive foreign oil.¹⁵ Scheuer contends that bin Laden’s widespread support among Muslims results from his coherent and consistent argument that “an attack on Islam is under way and is being led and directed by America.”¹⁶ Bin Laden’s call for a defensive jihad (holy war) against America is gaining popularity, because it justifies attacks on America that are grounded in both Islamic law and the widespread Muslim outrage toward America foreign policy.¹⁷

The author’s work in analyzing and explaining al Qaeda is truly superb. Drawing on his vast knowledge of al Qaeda and Islamic culture, Scheuer lucidly and persuasively articulates both al Qaeda’s limited goals and explains the reasons behind al Qaeda’s continued growth. Many of his current arguments build naturally on similar arguments made in his first book, *Through Our Enemies Eyes*.¹⁸ His well-articulated analysis provides compelling evidence that American foreign policy is increasing al Qaeda’s strength. Moreover, he successfully demonstrates that America is failing to grasp this crucial fact.¹⁹ However, when Scheuer moves beyond this theory and attempts to show that America’s failure to understand al Qaeda is *causing* her to lose the war on terror, his results become increasingly mixed.

III. The Okay

Imperial Hubris advances several examples of how misunderstanding al Qaeda is causing America to lose the war on terror. While this analysis is intriguing, the author attempts to use his theory to explain too much, thus oversimplifying foreign policy decisions and overemphasizing the consequences of failing to understand al Qaeda. Nonetheless, his cogent arguments make an important contribution to the study of the war on terror.

⁹ *Id.* at 19.

¹⁰ *See id.* at 104 (“bin Laden certainly is the most popular anti-American leader in the world today . . . his face and sayings are emblazoned on T-shirts, CDs, audio and videotapes, posters, photographs, cigarette lighters, and stationary across the earth.”). For a general discussion of bin Laden’s popularity *see id.* at 104-26.

¹¹ *See id.* at 70.

¹² *Compare id.* at 71 (“bin Laden’s organization continues to exist in areas where it was established before the 11 September attacks”) *and id.* at 77 (“Iraq and Lebanon [] provide additional examples of how [al Qaeda can] establish itself in places where it had little if any pre- 11 September presence”), with Rebecca Carr, *FBI Says al-Qaida is Decimated*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION July 27, 2002, at A8 (“Senior FBI officials believe there are now no more than 200 hard-core al-Qaida members throughout the world.”), *and* Fawaz A. Gerges, *Dismantling al-Qaida*, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 23, 2003, at C5 (“Since Sept. 11, U.S. officials . . . agree, nearly 65 percent of al-Qaida’s leaders have been killed or captured.”).

¹³ *See* ANONYMOUS, *supra* note 1, at 17 (al Qaeda’s goal “is a war against a specific target and for specific, limited purposes”).

¹⁴ *See id.* at 240 (“The United States is hated across the Islamic world because of specific U.S. government policies and actions.”).

¹⁵ *See id.* at 258.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 7-8.

¹⁷ *See id.* at 231 (“U.S. government actions . . . are seen by Muslims as more proof of bin Laden’s claim that America is malignantly inclined toward Islam.”).

¹⁸ ANONYMOUS, *THROUGH OUR ENEMIES EYES: OSAMA BIN LADEN, RADICAL ISLAM, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA* (2001). Published before 11 September 2001, *Through Our Enemies Eyes* is regarded by many as the authoritative book on al Qaeda. *See, e.g.,* Benjamin Schwarz, *Wolves, Actors, Jihadis*, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1, 2004, at 125 (maintaining that *Through Our Enemies Eyes* is the best book written on al Qaeda).

¹⁹ *See* ANONYMOUS, *supra* note 1, at 240 (“While important voices in the United States claim the intent of U.S. policy is misunderstood by Muslims . . . America is hated and attacked because Muslims believe they know precisely what the United States is doing to the Islamic world.”).

Scheuer first contends that the failure to understand al Qaeda is causing America to treat al Qaeda as a law enforcement problem instead of a wartime enemy. According to Scheuer, America continues to view al Qaeda as an isolated group of terrorists instead of a growing international army.²⁰ He supports this claim by citing numerous acts and statements from American political leaders. For instance, he cites former Attorney General John Ashcroft's statement that the capture of two al Qaeda fighters is "proof we are winning the war on terrorism."²¹ Scheuer argues that this law-and-order approach to fighting terrorism stems directly from policymakers misunderstanding of bin Laden and the al Qaeda network.²² He maintains that a "bin Laden-incited jihad cannot be defeated, deterred, or worried" by using the law-enforcement tactic of "arrest and conviction."²³ *Imperial Hubris* wisely notes that law enforcement alone is not a winning war strategy against al Qaeda and correctly questions the wisdom of detaining warriors in Afghanistan and Iraq instead of killing them in battle.²⁴ However, Scheuer fails to acknowledge that much of America's resort to law enforcement tactics stems from an inability to distinguish al Qaeda fighters from innocent civilians. Accordingly, while it is easy to critique the use of law-enforcement techniques to fight a war, Scheuer is unwilling to admit that America's inability to identify friend from foe—especially in countries where America is not at war—is at least partially responsible for the law-enforcement approach used in fighting al Qaeda.

Secondly, Scheuer asserts that the failure to understand al Qaeda is causing America to lose on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. He argues that American's false belief that "a few Muslim fanatics hate democracy and freedom [is weakening] America's ability to resist by underestimating the brains, patience, and religion-based fortitude of our foes."²⁵ While critiquing American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq,²⁶ Scheuer argues that America's misunderstanding of al Qaeda has resulted in two critical flaws with the current war strategy: a misguided attempt to democratize and secularize Islamic countries, and an unwillingness to accept American casualties.²⁷ Scheuer asserts that American ignorance of al Qaeda's true grievances fosters the following attitude:

America does not need to reevaluate its policies, let alone change them; it merely needs to better explain the wholesomeness of its views and the purity of its purposes to the uncomprehending Muslim world. What could be more American in the early twenty-first century, after all, then to re-identify a *casus belli* as a communication problem, and then call on Madison Avenue to package and hawk a remedy called "Democracy, Secularism, and Capitalism Are Good for Muslims" to an Islamic world that has, to date, violently refused to purchase.²⁸

Scheuer looks at current policies in Afghanistan and Iraq to illustrate how America is pursuing democracy in the Middle East. He then draws on historical analysis to demonstrate why these democratization efforts are likely to fail. In Afghanistan, Scheuer argues that America's decision to install the western-educated Hamid Karzai and exclude ethnic Pashtuns from the political process created an Afghani government with no chance of providing long-term stability.²⁹ He concludes that instead of recognizing the historical truth that an Islamist must rule Afghanistan, American efforts at democratization are "reinvigorat[ing] a broad, popular, and predictable xenophobia toward foreign occupation."³⁰ Similarly, he argues America's military occupation of Iraq—Islam's second holiest land—and American policies promoting a democratic, secular,

²⁰ See *id.* at 188.

²¹ *Id.* (quoting Daniel Byman, *Scoring the War on Terrorism*, NAT'L INT., Summer 2003, at 75).

²² See *id.* at 185-86 ("[I]n bin Laden's case this [law enforcement] solution is encouraged by our leaders' insistence that bin Laden means to destroy our freedom, liberties, and democracy.").

²³ *Id.* at 188.

²⁴ See *id.* at 221 ("This [law-enforcement] approach . . . has failed miserably . . . it is the reason we are losing in Afghanistan.").

²⁵ *Id.* at 249.

²⁶ See, e.g., *id.* at 24 (arguing that the military was unprepared to attack al Qaeda immediately after the September 11th attacks).

²⁷ See *id.* at 242 ("Because Americans are not used to a professional military fighting their wars, they are too worried by casualties.").

²⁸ *Id.* at 166-67.

²⁹ See *id.* at 202.

³⁰ *Id.*

government in Baghdad are legitimizing bin Laden's claim that America is directly attacking Islam.³¹ He maintains that the Iraqi invasion is "bin Laden's gift from America, one he has long and ardently desired, but never realistically expected."³²

Scheuer astutely argues that the solution to defeating Islamic extremism is not a "quick transformation of the Muslim world to a Western-style democratic system."³³ However, he fails to address the reality that extremist Islamic states, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, actively assisted al Qaeda. As a result, Scheuer dodges the difficult question of what type of government the United States should encourage in Middle Eastern countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. While he correctly asserts that aggressively installing secular, democratic governments "force[s] upon other peoples a system of government"³⁴ they do not want, it is also true that, left alone, extreme Islamic governments will continue to harbor terrorists determined to attack the United States.

A third contention by Scheuer is that the United States' misunderstanding of al Qaeda is preventing Americans from using the U.S. military's full capabilities. Scheuer denounces America's decision to use massive air strikes and limit ground troops in Afghanistan.³⁵ Similarly, he claims the Iraqi invasion was fought using "admirable speed" but "little killing" that left much of Saddam's 400,000 soldier army intact.³⁶ Scheuer argues that America's aversion to casualties results in today's military fighting a doctrine of nonwars, a term he defines as follows: "[F]ight and win quickly; do not kill many of the enemy, destroy much of his property, or kill many of his civilians; and, above all, lose the barest minimum of U.S. soldiers."³⁷ He argues that these quick, bloodless wars leave the enemy unbeaten and fail to deliver a total victory over the enemy population.³⁸

Scheuer fairly asserts that the U.S. military has not decisively defeated the enemy in Afghanistan or Iraq. He also raises legitimate concerns about whether the decision to limit ground troops and minimize casualties inhibits military victories in general.³⁹ However, Scheuer ignores the fact that using too much military force would alienate friends within Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Muslim allies throughout the world.⁴⁰ While he advocates a Sherman-like solution of "caus[ing] so much suffering to the [population] that they will long for peace,"⁴¹ Scheuer fails to recognize that overwhelming military force would further incite Muslim anger and increase the popularity of al Qaeda. This oversight is surprising and ironic, because the rationale behind limiting military force is the exact same rationale Scheuer himself uses to advocate against democratization.

IV. The Bad

The biggest disappointment of *Imperial Hubris* is that despite the author's straight-forward writing style, he fails to clearly articulate his actual policy proposal: America needs to re-evaluate her foreign policy toward the Middle East. Had Scheuer asserted his belief that American foreign policy is harming Islam and then candidly argued that defeating al Qaeda requires Americans to change that policy, readers could follow his argument, even if they did not support it. His failure to

³¹ See *id.* at 213-14 ("The fatwas that greeted the Iraqi invasion essentially validated all bin Laden has said in arguing for a defensive jihad against the United States.").

³² *Id.* at 212-13.

³³ *Id.* at 205. While elections have recently taken place in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it is too soon to judge their success in establishing stable democratic governments.

³⁴ *Id.* at 206.

³⁵ See *id.* at 244.

³⁶ See *id.* at 181.

³⁷ *Id.* at 178.

³⁸ See *id.* at 244.

³⁹ See *id.* ("By seeking others to do our Afghan dirty work, U.S. national security has been hurt. This probably is a lesson that is globally applicable."); cf. RALPH PETERS, *FIGHTING FOR THE FUTURE: WILL AMERICA TRIUMPH* (1999) (providing a similar argument that America and its soldiers are unprepared for the mercilessness required in modern warfare).

⁴⁰ See Richard A. Clarke, *Is the War on Terror a Failure?*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 4, 2004, at 14 ("Regrettably, [Scheuer] does not write much on working with Islamic friends. He tends to lump all Muslims into a single group, bound by their dogmatic hatred of America. In that, he is surely wrong—although less wrong every day.").

⁴¹ ANONYMOUS, *supra* note 1, at 171.

forthrightly do so makes the reader glean his position from throughout the book. Two examples where Scheuer reveals his true position include his claim that America's support of Middle East tyrants "mock our heritage and mar our democratic example,"⁴² and his assertion that America's "obtuse" support of "arrogant" and "racist" Israeli policies further enslaves the Muslim community.⁴³ Instead of advancing an honest proposal for changing American foreign policy, Scheuer takes an unnecessary and dangerous digression to argue that America must engage in a massive military assault on Islam and the Middle East.⁴⁴ Despite the author's acerbic rhetoric, no one should seriously consider the author's argument that America attack the world's 1.3 billion Muslims.⁴⁵ As one scholar noted, that solution "would more closely resemble Hitler's march on Moscow than Sherman's March to the Sea."⁴⁶ If this were the author's true agenda, the reader would indeed complete the book "grateful that as an intelligence analyst [Scheuer] has no direct role in actual policy formulation."⁴⁷ More likely, Scheuer's talk of epic battles is meant to illustrate his view of just how badly things will deteriorate if America refuses to rethink the way its policies are affecting the Islamic world.⁴⁸ If Scheuer had more honestly presented his viewpoint, he would have fostered a more meaningful discussion about how America should proceed in winning the war on Islamic terrorism.

V. The Ugly

A second problem with *Imperial Hubris* is the author's many unhelpful accusations and unnecessary diatribes throughout the book. During the course of the book, Scheuer belittles Statesmen,⁴⁹ attacks colleagues,⁵⁰ criticizes journalists,⁵¹ and indicts sources as "damnable traitors."⁵² Equally troubling, he assails military officers for passively accepting Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's "flawed" strategy of waging lighter, faster wars.⁵³ Amazingly, in leveling this last accusation, Scheuer fails to mention former Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, who candidly assessed the Iraqi war plan before Congress.⁵⁴ Many believe this critique is what caused General Shinseki's early retirement.⁵⁵ These insensitive and unenlightened comments weaken Scheuer's credibility and detract from his otherwise important and informative work.

VI. Conclusion

Imperial Hubris persuasively argues that America is misunderstanding both al Qaeda's nature and its goals. The book succeeds by providing rich insights into the growth of al Qaeda and describing American foreign policy from the perspective of the Islamic world. Additionally, *Imperial Hubris* demonstrates how America's failure to understand al Qaeda is limiting

⁴² *Id.* at 247.

⁴³ *Id.* at 230; *see also id. passim.*

⁴⁴ *See id.* at 241.

⁴⁵ Several Internet sites have identified the number of Muslims in the world by aggregating the population of Muslims in every country from data provided in *The CIA World's Facts Book*. For example, *see* <http://www.islamicweb.com/begin/results.htm> (identifying the number of Muslims in the world at 1.6 billion by aggregating the population of Muslims in every country relying on data provided in *The CIA World's Facts Book*) (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).

⁴⁶ Andrew J. Bacevich, *Soft Words or the Big Stick*, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2004, at 6.

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ For example, at one point Scheuer argues America should revise those "foreign polices now endangering national security and leaving us with only the military option to pursue." ANONYMOUS, *supra* note 1, at 207.

⁴⁹ *See id.* at 206, 223 (calling President Woodrow Wilson a "bloody-handed fantasist," and Henry Kissinger "droning" and "oracular").

⁵⁰ *See id.* at xii, 216 (alleging that the intelligence community is filled with moral cowards who lack the courage to tell policymakers the truth about al Qaeda).

⁵¹ *See id.* at 196 (calling journalists the "world's gossips").

⁵² *Id.* at 199 (maintaining many who leak information are "deliberately giving the enemy aid and comfort").

⁵³ *See id.* at 178-79 (criticizing U.S. generals for careerism and moral cowardice for failing to resign when civilian leadership in the Defense Department insists on fighting quick, low-casualty wars).

⁵⁴ When asked by a Senate committee to estimate the number of troops needed for the operation, General Eric Shinseki said "several hundred thousand." *See* Eric Schmitt, *Pentagon Contradicts General On Iraq Occupation Force's Size*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at A4.

⁵⁵ For example, *see* the statement of Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle (Mar. 23, 2004) (stating "General Shinseki seems to have become a target when he spoke honestly about the number of troops that would be needed in Iraq"), *available at* <http://democrats.senate.gov/~dpc/releases/2004323740.html> (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).

America's success in the war on terror. *Imperial Hubris* is so compelling it tempts the reader into believing its claim that America now has no choice but to engage in "relentless, brutal, and [] blood-soaked offensive military actions until we have annihilated the Islamists who threaten us."⁵⁶ However, that approach is not only unwise, but in fact incongruent with Scheuer's own analysis. Rather, *Imperial Hubris* demonstrates that in order to win the war on terror, America must reevaluate "her failed policies toward the Muslim world."⁵⁷ There is no doubt that rethinking America's relationship with both Israel and tyrannical Middle Eastern governments will involve difficult, complex policy decisions. While there are no easy solutions, *Imperial Hubris* makes an important and necessary first step: identifying the problem, and beginning the dialogue.

⁵⁶ ANONYMOUS, *supra* note 1, at 85.

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 242.

SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE: BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE¹

REVIEWED BY MAJOR BILLY B. RUHLING, II²

*We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.*³

War is a means to a political end, measured on a continuum with state-sponsored aggression merely one extreme to accomplish collective goals.⁴ *Solving the War Puzzle*, by John Norton Moore, breaks from this conceptualization to elucidate a new theory of why nations engage in war.⁵ In so doing, Moore critiques traditionalist, idealist, and realist paradigms, as well as the theory of democratic peace, which have been used to explain and predict the behavior of international actors with respect to the decision to engage in war. After challenging the underpinnings of these various theories Moore proposes a refinement to the democratic peace initiative, which he refers to as “incentive theory,” in an effort to produce a “more predictive and workable theory about the causes of war.”⁶ To this end, Moore concludes that “[t]he absence of democracy, the absence of effective deterrence, and, most importantly, the synergy of an absence of both are conditions or factors that predispose to war.”⁷

Much of the research for his book was conducted by Moore and students enrolled in his war and peace seminar at the University of Virginia and Georgetown Law Schools.⁸ The book builds upon research he began while working at the U.S. Institute of Peace and much of the writing has appeared piecemeal through various articles in scholarly journals.⁹

This review explores earlier explanations of the factors affecting the decision to wage war and analyzes Moore’s critiques of these factors. It then considers the contribution to the intellectual pursuit offered by Moore’s new model to explain decision-making in this important aspect of nation-state interaction. Finally, it discusses the applicability of Moore’s incentive theory to the contemporary operational environment¹⁰ facing the United States.

¹ JOHN NORTON MOORE, *SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE: BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE* (2004). Moore is the Walter L. Brown Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. He previously served as Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Institute of Peace, Counselor on International Law to the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly and the Athens round of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. *See id.* at 173.

² U.S. Army. Written while assigned as a student, 53d Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.

³ CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, *ON WAR* 87 (Michael C. Howard & Peter Paret trans. & eds., 1976).

⁴ *See id.*

⁵ *See* MOORE, *supra* note 1, at xiii.

⁶ *Id.* at xix.

⁷ *Id.* at 67.

⁸ *See id.* at xiv, 99-100 nn.34-36, 102 n.1. Such techniques call into question the intellectual rigor of some of Moore’s writing because he draws support for key portions of his thesis from his own writings and those of students writing in furtherance of their participation in his war and peace seminar.

⁹ *See, e.g.,* John Norton Moore, *Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in United Nations Peacekeeping, Collective Security, and War Avoidance*, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 811 (1997); John Norton Moore, *Solving the War Puzzle*, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 282 (2003); John Norton Moore, *Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle*, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 341 (2004); John Norton Moore, *Newer Theories in Understanding War: From the Democratic Peace to Incentive Theory*, NAT’L SECURITY L. (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005).

¹⁰ The phrase contemporary operational environment is a doctrinal term developed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. It refers to

the overall operational environment that exists today and in the near future (out to the year 2020). The range of threats during this period extends from smaller, lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetrical ways. In some possible conflicts (or in multiple, concurrent conflicts), a combination of these types of threats could be especially problematic.

U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK NO. 02-08 ch. 1, sec. 1, available at <https://call2.army.mil/products/handbook/02-8/02-8ch1.asp> (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter CALL Handbook] (on file with author).

War has been waged from the earliest dawn of civilization, giving rise to an analysis of its causes and ways to prevent such conflicts.¹¹ Early philosophers devoted volumes to the subject.¹² Unfortunately, the question of why war persists remains unsolved. For members of the profession of arms, seeking to solve this “puzzle” is, and should be, of paramount concern. For this reason *Solving the War Puzzle*, deserves consideration.

Three primary schools of thought have dominated thinking about the war puzzle. Followers of the first two paradigms, “idealists” and “realists,” struggled against one another throughout much of the early modern era.¹³ The former “focus[ed] on the role of third party dispute settlement, creation of international organizations, enhancing trade and other peaceful interactions among nations, and the role of democratic governance.”¹⁴ Meanwhile, realists focused on international factors, particularly the complexities of competition between, and interaction among, nation states.¹⁵ Early in his analysis, Moore dismisses these two schools of thought, but fails to provide any academic or intellectual rationale for doing so.¹⁶ He merely concludes that neither theory adequately explains real-life experience.¹⁷

As early as 1795, philosopher Immanuel Kant posited that governmental form could influence the overall characteristic for peacefulness of a particular state.¹⁸ Largely ignored until relatively recently by modern international relations scholars, this concept formed the basis for the “democratic peace” theory.¹⁹ This newest paradigm has gained nearly universal acceptance among academicians.²⁰ It relies upon two primary principles. First, it “posits that major war (over 1000 total casualties) has been occurring between democracies at an extremely low rate.”²¹ In supporting this proposition scholars rely upon a definition of what constitutes major war that limits it to conflicts that resulted in greater than 1000 casualties.²² Of course, this opens this theory up to criticism because it is unclear why an act of aggression resulting in fewer than 1000 casualties should be ignored in the evaluation.²³ Moore further elects to focus on wars that have occurred since the adoption of the United Nations Charter.²⁴ Such a distinction seems to arbitrarily restrict the period of consideration to that after which the threat of nuclear annihilation had been exposed, and also to that time period wherein collective security agreements seriously undermined the need for aggressive combat actions.

Second, the theory of the democratic peace relies upon the assumption that democracies do not initiate wars, but rather, respond in self-defense to actions by non-democracies.²⁵ Moore acknowledges that many social scientists would quibble

¹¹ See Francis T. Underhill, Jr., *Modernized Societies and the Uses of War*, in *THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT I* (Captain John J. McIntyre ed., 1979) (arguing that while the human trait of violence persists, armed conflict, has lost its utility as a means for state accomplishment of political goals).

¹² See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, *THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE* (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646).

¹³ See *id.* at xviii-xix.

¹⁴ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at xvii-xviii.

¹⁵ See *id.* at xviii.

¹⁶ See *id.* at xviii-xix.

¹⁷ See *id.* at xvii-xviii.

¹⁸ See generally Immanuel Kant, *Eternal Peace*, in *ETERNAL PEACE AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS* (Boston: World Peace Found. 1981).

¹⁹ See, e.g., BRUCE RUSSETT, *GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD* (1993) (outlining the general theory that democratic nations do not wage aggressive wars); *DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE* (Michael E. Brown, et al. eds., 1996, second printing 1997) (exploring the historical foundation upon which the democratic peace theory is based and challenging its applicability).

²⁰ See Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, *Debate on the ‘Democratic Peace’: A Review*, *AM. DIPL.*, vol ix, no. 1 (2004), at http://www.cianet.org/olj/ad/ad_v9_1/gis01.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).

²¹ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at xviii.

²² See *id.* at 20.

²³ Such a definition ignores the U.S.’s involvement in operations in both Panama and Grenada. See, e.g., Michael E. O’Hanlon and James Reed, *Panama’s Combat Lessons Apply to Iraq*, *JAPAN TIMES*, Mar. 15, 2003, available at <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20030315.htm> (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); Julie Wolfe, *People and Events: The Grenada Invasion*, available at <http://pbs.org/wgbh/amex/Reagan/peopleevents/pande07.html> (last visited Feb. 2, 2005). It is hard to imagine a scenario wherein a reasonable person would not call these actions aggressive or even refer to them as wars. Certainly Soldiers in those countries would not call them anything else.

²⁴ See MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 14.

²⁵ See *id.* at 13.

with this claim, and it is probably the tenant of the theory most open to criticism.²⁶ The concept relies upon the idea that in a democracy, the electorate bears the costs of any decision to engage in aggressive military behavior.²⁷ Certainly this appears to be the case as Lyndon Johnson discovered in 1968 wherein the Vietnam conflict played a major role in the election.²⁸ Proponents of the democratic peace claim, on the other hand, that leaders in non-democratic nations are able to externalize these costs upon the populace.²⁹ Once again, Moore imposes an artificially restrictive methodology on the analysis. As he weighs critiques of the democratic peace theory that point to democratic nations that have engaged in aggressive war, he concludes that this paradigm should really only be used to evaluate “liberal democracies.”³⁰ As the book unfolds, and Moore elaborates upon his theory, it appears that if the model does not quite account for reality, Moore will redefine the experiment.³¹ Unfortunately, as a result, the book rambles and fails to engage the reader.

The frailties in these areas, as well as others, allow Moore to conclude that, despite his earlier advocacy of the democratic peace theory, the current models being used to solve the war puzzle are insufficient.³² The factor that he finds missing is that of deterrence.³³ In particular, he highlights the need to incorporate the concept that international factors can balance the internal decisions of regime elites.³⁴ In the end, Moore’s theory claims that “major interstate war seems predominantly to be a synergy between a potential aggressive nondemocratic regime and an absence of effective levels of deterrence.”³⁵ Unfortunately, it takes two-thirds of the book before he finally makes this point and delineates exactly what the theory entails. Throughout the latter portion of the book, Moore continues to refine his theory by addressing potential criticisms until he acknowledges that his theory really posits a continuum of interaction between the democratic nature of the regime and the existence of an *effective* level of deterrence.³⁶

Incentive Theory for the Professional Military Officer

Moore’s theory is designed to provide a model through which one can predict, explain, or even prevent, the decision by a government to engage in war, a worthwhile consideration for any professional military officer. As instruments of government policy, officers often find themselves involved in discourse with a much more lasting impact upon the diplomatic process.³⁷ As recent experience in Iraq has proven, even relatively junior company grade officers may find themselves involved in the diplomatic process through the still violent post-conflict phase of operations.³⁸ Having a paradigm in place

²⁶ See *id.* at 16.

²⁷ See *id.* at 11.

²⁸ See Richard W. Stevenson, *White House Again Backs Amendment on Marriage*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at A1 (drawing parallels between the Vietnam war’s effect on Johnson’s presidency and President Bush’s situation vis-a-vis Iraq).

²⁹ See *id.* at 60-61.

³⁰ See *id.* at 85.

³¹ This concept of a self-fulfilling prophecy in theories that try to explain wars has been explained as:

persistent patterns in war and peace have not been found for the simple reason that they do not exist. Many historians, reacting against shoddy generalizations, argue that the causes of each war and each period of peace are different. In their mind a search for strong patterns is a search for a mirage.

GEOFFREY BLAINEY, *THE CAUSES OF WAR* 35 (1973).

³² See MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 38.

³³ See *id.* at 27.

³⁴ See *id.*

³⁵ *Id.* at 39.

³⁶ See *id.* at 78.

³⁷ See, e.g., Chris Tomlinson, *Criminal Court Resumes Work in Iraq*, available at <http://www.wtopnews.com/index.php?sid=839&nid=105&template=print> (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) (describing the involvement of Army judge advocates in vetting judges, identifying courtrooms, and reconstituting the Iraqi criminal court system after Operation Iraqi Freedom).

³⁸ See, e.g., George Packer, *War After the War: What Washington Doesn’t See in Iraq*, NEW YORKER, Nov. 24, 2003, at 59, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?031124fa_fact1_3 (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) (detailing the infrastructure and local council interactions of one company commander and his unit in Iraq).

through which such an officer may consider his actions can enable him to be more effective in such a role. Hopefully, this more reasoned approach will lead to a more rich discourse in order to avoid future conflict.

The contemporary operational environment (COE) in which members of the profession of arms exist does not necessarily involve traditional state-on-state aggressive military action. Far more likely, under the COE, military conflicts occur between non-linear military organizations or non-state actors, such as al Qaeda.³⁹ Moore argues that the incentive theory still applies in such a scenario, because the same ability to externalize costs exists for decision elites,⁴⁰ and there is a lack of effective deterrence.⁴¹ Applying incentive theory to such a scenario highlights one of the primary weaknesses of Moore's theory in that it assumes the regime elites recognize and acknowledge the level of deterrence, and will then avoid aggressive war. When one is dealing with extremists or fanatics, it is unclear that any level of deterrence will ever be sufficient to deter their aggression.⁴² This is particularly true where the attacker is engaged in a religiously-motivated critique of another society's value structure, for example a jihad. In such a case, it is easy to envision a paradigm in which the elites may actually desire to internalize the costs of their decision-making in order to enrich their position within the view of their deity. Moore asserts that adequate deterrence can be brought to bear upon terrorist leaders, but there is no explanation of how to do so.⁴³ If one believes Moore's explanation for the September 11th attacks, expanding the influence of "democracy, the rule of law, and human dignity" can prevent a recurrence of this type of tragedy.⁴⁴ This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that characterized the attacks by Islamic fundamentalists as an attempt to strike out at the excesses flaunted by a democratic society.⁴⁵ Moore fails to provide any insight into how incentive theory can serve to explain either this event or the response by democratic nations in Afghanistan and Iraq other than to boast that his approach "offers a significantly better paradigm . . . than contemporary prevailing approaches to international relations theory."⁴⁶

Throughout the critique of existing paradigms and Moore's development of his own incentive theory, he relies upon mathematical models developed by noted scholars in the field.⁴⁷ These models are not adequately explained in the body of the book, though they are thoroughly documented in the extensive endnotes.⁴⁸ He reinforces this academic work with research conducted by his seminar students. Together, they create a rambling approach to the questions of why wars have occurred, and why will they happen in the future. In the end, it reads like a sales pitch rather than a balanced intellectual inquiry into what is the best methodology for explaining this age old problem. Even so, it lays out a methodology that can be understood and applied by an officer, even if he has no formal educational training in international relations theory.

Despite its weaknesses, Moore's book ultimately provides a thought-provoking discourse for readers. While his ultimate conclusion is not earth-shattering in its originality, it highlights subtleties of nation state interaction that other authors fail to address in mainstream literature. He pulls back from the traditional concept that war is a legitimate method of accomplishing state goals, arguing instead that such violence should be removed from the continuum of potential options. As such, *Solving the War Puzzle* certainly has the potential to open a more robust discourse both within and beyond the academic realm. As the roles being filled by military officers in current operations expand to involve tasks that more closely resemble diplomacy

³⁹ See CALL Handbook, *supra* note 10, at ch. 1, sec. 1.

⁴⁰ Decision elites are the regime personnel that control the decision to commit force in a given situation. For example, Moore identifies George W. Bush, Tony Blair, Saddam Hussein, and the leaders of the UN Security Council member countries as having been the decision elites in the Iraq War. See MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 78.

⁴¹ See *id.* at 69.

⁴² See *id.* at 37. Moore attempts to make his theory fit the terrorist model by stating that "extreme ideology is a factor to be considered in assessing levels of deterrence, it does not mean that deterrence is doomed to fail in such settings but only that it must be at higher levels . . . to be effective . . ." *Id.* Recent experience, though, runs counter to this explanation. Moore never defines when this deterrence is sufficient nor does he provide any concrete examples of it working.

⁴³ See *id.* at 71-72.

⁴⁴ See *id.* at 71.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Duncan Campbell, *US Shifts Bases to Eastern Europe*, GUARDIAN (London), May 2, 2003, at 20 (citing resentment of the U.S. presence in the middle east and citing this as one of the reasons for the attacks of September 11); Ching Cheong, *New Chapter for the American Empire*, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Sept. 12, 2002, at analysis sec. (analyzing the change in policy style in the United States after the September 11th terrorist bombings and characterizing it as an empire building mentality); Jim Landers, *Coping with Reform in Qatar*, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 4, 2002, at 1A (documenting Qatari resentment of U.S. efforts in the middle east).

⁴⁶ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 82.

⁴⁷ See, e.g., *id.* at 147-51.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., *id.* at 110 nn.25-26.

or nation-building,⁴⁹ it is important to have a mental image of how these processes can best promote peace. *Solving the War Puzzle* gives readers exactly that foundation, and critical reflection will enable readers to approach the puzzle with a view toward its successful resolution.

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Tomlinson, *supra* note 37.