

CLAMO Report

Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO)
The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army

Preparation Tips for the Deployment of a Brigade Operational Law Team (BOLT)

This is the fourth in a series of CLAMO notes discussing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for a Brigade Operational Law Team (BOLT) preparing to deploy to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). These TTPs are based on the observations and experiences of Operational Law (OPLAW) Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) at the JRTC. The JRTC OPLAW O/C Team suggests a four-stage "battle-focused training" approach to BOLT preparation for a JRTC rotation. This training first prepares the individual BOLT member, transitions to prepare the BOLT as a whole, then prepares the brigade staff, and finally focuses on the entire brigade task force. These training steps should prove useful to BOLTs in achieving success at the JRTC.

The final aspect of the BOLT training plan addresses BOLT preparation of the entire brigade task force. Although matters involving each core legal discipline affect the brigade during pre-deployment preparation, this article addresses three key areas that cause significant challenges for BOLTs—Rules of Engagement (ROE) Training and Dissemination, Fratricide and Serious Incident Reporting, and Law of War Training. It then offers TTPs on each to enhance the success of the BOLT and brigade by preparing the brigade for the legal hurdles to come.

ROE Training and Dissemination

Rules of Engagement are the commander's rules for the use of force and an operational responsibility. Nevertheless, responsibility for preparing, training, and disseminating ROE at the brigade level often falls on the BOLT as the staff section best equipped to assist operators navigating through higher headquarters ROE. The BOLTs must be involved early to

ensure that all brigade units and attachments are fully trained on baseline Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) for U.S. forces.¹ The BOLTs must also develop a plan to quickly distribute mission-specific ROE to the brigade upon receipt.

Training

Rules of Engagement training is an ongoing process that should be accomplished at the individual, small-unit, and leader levels. With the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) SROE as a focal point, ROE training using one of the many available training models ("five Ss" and "RAMP," for example) inculcates in every soldier a ready response to interactions with both civilians and declared hostile forces. Specifically, a soldier who is well-trained in the ROE should be able to recognize immediately and intuitively hostile forces and acts, and assess and react to demonstrated hostile intent with appropriate force to ensure mission success.

Identifying and appropriately reacting to threats requires more than a two-hour ROE briefing in a hot gymnasium the week before deployment. Army doctrine² and field experience show that soldier ROE training is best accomplished at the small-unit level with scenario-driven vignettes and situational training exercises (STX) that require soldiers to apply the ROE.³ Similarly, ROE training for leaders should culminate with command-post exercises (CPX), or field training exercises (FTX), or both.⁴ Recognizing the effectiveness of practical ROE application for training, XVIII Airborne Corps requires ROE inclusion into unit exercises at all levels.⁵ Before the start of XVIII Airborne Corps' recent Mission Rehearsal Exercise for forces deploying to Kosovo, Forces Command required platoon and company-sized units to complete STX lane training with integrated ROE components.⁶ Several resources contain sample vignettes for home-station training, including the CLAMO ROE Handbook,⁷ the Center for Army Lessons

1. CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3121.01A, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES, encl. A, para. 1c(1) (15 Jan. 2000) (partially classified document).

2. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS (1 Mar. 2000).

3. See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) HANDBOOK FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 2-2 (1 May 2000) [hereinafter ROE HANDBOOK] (training should begin in the classroom and end with exercises in the field). See also Major Mark S. Martins, *Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering*, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1994); INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK ch. 5 (2002) [hereinafter OPLAW HANDBOOK]; U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL), *ROE Training – An Alternative Approach*, CALL NEWSLETTER 96-6 (May 1996) [hereinafter CALL NEWSLETTER 96-6].

4. See ROE HANDBOOK, *supra* note 3, at 2-2; OPLAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 3, at 73.

5. U.S. ARMY XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS AND FORT BRAGG, REG. 350-41, ch. 18 (12 Jan. 1998).

6. See Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, Warning Order for Operation Dragon Guardian I KFOR 3A Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE), app. 5, tabs C-G (C1, 17 Jan. 2001) (containing situational training exercise (STX) lane training and evaluation outlines) (on file with author).

Learned Newsletter 96-6,⁸ and the CLAMO Web site at <http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/CLAMO-Training>.

While baseline ROE training on the JCS SROE is continuous, the brigade should begin mission-specific ROE training for JRTC in earnest at D-80, when the brigade receives the 21st Infantry Division (Light)⁹ (21st ID (L)) Operation Plan (OPLAN) and intelligence estimate.¹⁰ The OPLAN gives the staff a “90% solution” as to what they should expect upon deployment to Cortina,¹¹ including the mission-specific ROE. The intelligence products will identify the likely hostile forces. With this information, the BOLT can tailor briefings, training vignettes, and STXs to the specifics of the Cortina mission.

The BOLT that conducts pre-deployment ROE training often limits that training to the maneuver battalions, because they are the primary “shooters.” While enemy contact is part of the infantry mission, BOLTs should not neglect the other combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units. As the intelligence products indicate, Cortina is a fluid battlefield with a non-linear threat.¹² Terrorists, insurgents, government officials, and host-nation civilians are located everywhere, including the brigade support area (BSA), aviation assembly area (AAA), and artillery batteries, to name a few. Every brigade element carries weapons, and security detachments from the BSA, AAA, and other units often have contact with the denizens of Cortina. Because it only takes one ROE misapplication to endanger the force or affect national policy, BOLTs should ensure that everyone knows, understands, and applies the current ROE.¹³

Non-habitually assigned units pose a common dilemma for ROE trainers. Light infantry brigades training at the JRTC often attach elements from armored units, mechanized infantry units, Air Force, Marine, or special operations units, with which the brigade lacks a habitual relationship. While these units bring unique and powerful capabilities to the brigade, they also present a number of challenges for ROE training. The foremost challenge is distance, because the attached units are rarely co-

located with the brigade. The BOLT must assist in identifying who will be responsible for training these units on the deployment ROE, determining how they will conduct such training, and reporting completion of that training to the BOLT.

The brigade must understand and integrate the special capabilities of attached units. For example, a company commander who has spent his entire career in the Army light infantry community may find his unit working with a company of Marines with light armored vehicles for a mission. Although the S-3 and commander bear responsibility for the tactical integration of the team, the BOLT should be aware of the heightened risk of fratricide or ROE violations and consider supplemental ROE to mitigate these risks. The BOLT should recognize that any new weapon platform, vehicle, or uniform introduced to the brigade may call for ROE modifications to account for the brigade’s lack of familiarity with that new item.

Dissemination

The brigade staff receives the final mission-specific ROE with the Division Operations Order (OPORD) shortly before operations begin. With little time to conduct training, the brigade (and specifically, the BOLT) must ensure that the final ROE are disseminated throughout the entire force. Although most brigades publish ROE annexes and pocket cards, BOLTs rarely stop to consider whether these products effectively communicate the ROE to the target audience.

Pocket cards provide a resource for refresher hip-pocket training or perhaps a quick reference when time allows, but often go unread by the soldiers on the ground. They are further limited in their effectiveness due to their size. Pocket cards that merely restate the CJCS SROE and self-defense principles may have some value as a training aid but are no substitute for mission-specific ROE briefings and training. A soldier who must consult a card to determine whether to act in self-defense will likely be a casualty before he finishes reading the card. Pocket

7. ROE HANDBOOK, *supra* note 3, app. E.

8. CALL NEWSLETTER 96-6, *supra* note 3, app. C.

9. Brigades training at the JRTC are notionally attached to the 21st Infantry Division (Light), replicated by JRTC staff. U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND, REG. 350-50-2, TRAINING AT THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER (JRTC) para. 2-8b (15 June 1998) [hereinafter FORSCOM REG. 350-50-2].

10. *Id.* app. Y, tbl. Y-2.

11. “Cortina” is the name of the notional country roughly the size of Louisiana in which brigades conduct operations while at the JRTC. *See id.* app. H, para. H-1a.

12. *See, e.g.*, Headquarters, 21st Infantry Division (Light), Operations Order 01-XX-1, annex B (intelligence) [hereinafter OPORD 01-XX-1] (on file with author).

13. For example, the 10th Mountain Division soldiers deployed to Haiti in support of Operation Uphold Democracy were not trained or told they were authorized to prevent serious Haitian-on-Haitian criminal acts. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved ROE permitting such intervention on 18 September 1995, these ROE were not transmitted to the soldiers on the ground. Thus, on 20 September 1995, American television reporters filmed U.S. soldiers observing, but not intervening, as Haitian police beat Aristide supporters to death. The American public outcry resulted in an apparent “change” to the ROE the next day via a newly printed and distributed ROE card that permitted U.S. forces to prevent serious criminal acts that were observed. Although perceived by the public at large as a change in U.S. policy, it was in reality a failure to distribute previously approved ROE throughout the force. Nevertheless, failure to draft, distribute, and train ROE properly resulted in media scrutiny and criticism of the highest levels of command. *See* CENTER FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 1994-1995: LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 37-39 (11 Dec. 1995).

cards listing mission-specific ROE are limited by security classification requirements. Moreover, production and distribution constraints may also hinder ROE card effectiveness.

An ROE annex to the brigade order puts all the ROE in one easy-to-access location. The BOLTs, however, often abbreviate these annexes because they feel pressured to produce a product quickly. These annexes often lack precision and contain inaccuracies. The 21st ID (L) Division ROE annex is about fourteen pages.¹⁴ Brigade staff sections are often pressured to keep their respective annexes to one to two pages in length. Assuming that the Division order did not contain needless or redundant language in its ROE, “distilling” the Division annex into a one-page “summary” may eliminate clarifying language that is important to the Division commander and staff.

Additionally, time is scarce and copies of the OPORD are even more scarce. After the Division OPORD briefing, the brigade staff shares one copy of the order, with each section taking their relevant annex.¹⁵ This generally means that the BOLT often gets the ROE annex, thereby assuming responsibility for the brigade’s adherence to the ROE as the staff conducts mission analysis and follow-on phases of the Military Decision Making Process.¹⁶ It also indicates that attention to, and comprehension of, the ROE at units below brigade level may be suspect. Although publication of an ROE annex purports to accomplish the specified task to “[d]isseminate the ROE . . . to the lowest echelons of all units . . . ,”¹⁷ in reality it is often nothing more than a *pro forma* attempt to satisfy this Division-directed task.

The BOLT must ensure that the brigade is aware of all Division ROE—those contained in the ROE annex as well as those in the coordinating instructions to other parts of the OPORD. When necessary, the BOLT should raise ROE issues during mission analysis and ensure that the various staff sections incorporate ROE into both mission planning and specific portions of the brigade OPORD. For example, firing battery personnel, forward observers, and mortarmen most likely refer to the fire support annex for their portion of the mission. As such, restrictions on fires in populated areas should be placed in this annex, to be read by the target audience. Rules of Engagement applicable to multiple brigade elements should be developed in the operations annex or base order.

Finally, the BOLT should brief mission-critical ROE or significant ROE changes to company and battalion commanders and staff during the brigade OPORD brief. This allows the BOLT to identify for subordinate commanders the Division’s specified task to ensure all brigade personnel are briefed and trained on the ROE, as well as the requirement to report that training back to Division through the BOLT.

Rules of Engagement training and dissemination is a comprehensive task. At the soldier level, JCS SROE training should be a part of routine garrison training at all levels. Before a JRTC deployment, the training should intensify, incorporating mission-specific ROE from the D-80 OPLAN into briefings and training events. The BOLT should coordinate with the brigade S-3 to ensure that attached units also receive the training. Upon receipt of the OPORD, the BOLT needs to analyze all ROE and distribute the ROE through the lowest echelons so that all understand when and how force is employed appropriately.

Fratricide and Serious Incident Reporting

The BOLT often struggles with discovering, investigating, and analyzing fratricides,¹⁸ inappropriate uses of force against civilians, and other serious incidents. The lack of attention units give to these incidents typically results in a failure to report timely and accurately, investigate, and analyze the incidents to incorporate lessons learned into subsequent operations. Home station preparation can alleviate these concerns.

Discussed in detail below, each of these issues may stem in part from a soldier and leader’s lack of appreciation of the full impact of fratricides and other serious incidents on the unit. Reporting and investigation requirements are not merely Army requirements;¹⁹ they serve practical purposes not always apparent to brigade leaders who traditionally focus on maneuver. At the tactical level, fratricides and other serious incidents involving civilians inject friction by bleeding off combat power and angering the local population. At the operational and strategic levels, however, these incidents can impact United States or host nation resolve, or dramatically affect ROE and the conduct of future operations.²⁰ Brigade commanders and Information Operations sections must know the facts of serious incidents

14. OPORD 01-XX-1, *supra* note 12, annex E (Rules of Engagement).

15. At the JRTC, this distribution method has been observed in practice and spelled out in several brigade Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOPs).

16. OPLAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 3, at 475-90.

17. OPORD 01-XX-1, *supra* note 12, para. 3b(3).

18. “Fratricide” is defined as “the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly firepower.” U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-0, OPERATIONS para. 4-27 (14 June 2001) [hereinafter FM 3-0].

19. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 385-40, ACCIDENT REPORTING AND RECORDS paras. 2-4m, q (1 Nov. 1994) [hereinafter AR 385-40].

20. For example, the bombing of the Al-Firdos bunker in Baghdad during Desert Storm, killing 204 civilians, resulted in dramatic restrictions on further targeting within the city and a shift in focus of the air campaign. See RICK ATKINSON, CRUSADE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 285-96 (1993).

and fratricides and be able to address them when dealing with the media, host-nation political and law-enforcement officials, and higher headquarters. Commanders and staffs must quickly identify the causes of such incidents to ensure that they are not repeated. By integrating these themes throughout home station training, the BOLT can teach the brigade to place a priority on reporting, investigating, analyzing, and ultimately preventing these incidents.²¹

Reporting

Under the 21st ID (L) OPOrd, brigades must report serious incidents, including fratricides and inappropriate uses of force against civilians.²² When a fratricide or serious incident occurs, the O/Cs inform the rotational unit of such occurrence.²³ Knowledge, however, does not always equate to action. Accordingly, BOLTs frequently fail to learn of fratricides from the subordinate brigade units, and seldom within the Division time limits.²⁴ These reporting challenges occur most often because the shooting unit fails to report the event to battalion, the battalion does not forward it to brigade, or the brigade does not prioritize the report and route it to the BOLT.

Brigades can avoid these challenges by training to report fratricides and serious incidents through the chain of command to the BOLT as part of the unit Standing Operating Procedure (SOP). Given the severity of such incidents, investigations are inevitably required.²⁵ The BOLT should train the brigade to report these events and capture such reporting requirements and procedures in the brigade and battalion tactical SOPs, because these SOPs focus and direct unit operations while deployed on any exercise or operation.²⁶ Moreover, incident reporting should be reinforced during pre-deployment ROE training. The BOLT can emphasize the reporting requirement in the brigade

OPOrd by nominating fratricides and other serious incidents as a Commander's Critical Information Requirement for the brigade base order to reinforce the SOP and Division OPOrd requirements.²⁷ Finally, the BOLT should consider training battalion and brigade TOC radio-telephone operators and battle captains to report all fratricides and serious incidents to the BOLT.

Investigation

All fratricides and serious incidents during a training rotation at the JRTC require an investigation. Given the challenges and operating tempo of the JRTC battlefield, BOLTs routinely struggle with timely completion of satisfactory investigations, often falling short of Division suspenses. Simple pre-deployment preparation can facilitate completing these investigations.

Armed with the knowledge that fratricides and serious incidents require an investigation, the BOLT should prepare subordinate commanders and staff officers to become investigating officers (IO) and devise a system to appoint and resource them when a fratricide occurs. The BOLT should request signature authority from the brigade commander to appoint the IO²⁸ and coordinate with the brigade S-1 to obtain a Department of the Army (DA) Form 6 containing the names of officers who can potentially serve as an IO.²⁹ Before deployment, the BOLT should prepare investigation packets containing Privacy Act statements, sworn statement forms, copies of *Army Regulation (AR) 15-6*, and DA Form 1574 (Report of Investigation). Legal specialists should stand by to assist the IOs as soon as they are appointed and as needed throughout the investigation.

The BOLT should also seek opportunities to teach leader development classes on these issues before deployment. These

21. Law of War and ROE training, covered in this note, address the long-term home station training designed to prevent such incidents. Although the BOLT has a part in fratricide prevention by virtue of its role in investigation review and ROE development, fratricide avoidance is primarily an operational responsibility. See FM 3-0, *supra* note 18, para. 4-27. Fratricide prevention TTPs are available in various newsletters and guides from the CALL, accessible on-line at <http://call.army.mil>.

22. OPOrd 01-XX-1, *supra* note 12, para. 3d(2)(c)(5) (Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR)). See also *id.* annex E, app. 1 (Rules of Engagement, reports).

23. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER, OBSERVER/CONTROLLER HANDBOOK, app. K, para. K-1 (6th ed. 1990).

24. Over the past two years, brigades suffered an average of twenty-two fratricides per JRTC training rotation. Less than 15% of all fratricides are reported to or discovered by the BOLT through brigade channels. The JRTC OPLAW O/C team maintains a fratricide database for standard brigade combat rotations.

25. AR 385-40, *supra* note 19, para. 2-4m, q.

26. The BOLT should coordinate any recommended changes to the TACSOP with the brigade S-3 and submit the recommended language and location revisions as soon as they are identified. The brigade S-3 can also provide information concerning the timing of the next TACSOP revision.

27. See, e.g., OPOrd 01-XX-1, *supra* note 12, para. 3d(2)(c)(5).

28. Notwithstanding Army regulations, at JRTC brigade level commanders are delegated authority to appoint IOs to investigate rotational fratricides. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 15-6, PROCEDURE FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS para. 2-1a(3) (30 Sept. 1996) [hereinafter AR 15-6] (only a general court-martial convening authority or his staff delegate can appoint an IO for certain incidents), with FORSCOM REG. 350-50-2, *supra* note 9, para. 3-3b (JRTC Operations Group Commander can order brigade chain of command to investigate simulated fratricides in accordance with AR 15-6).

29. A DA Form 6 is a roster of names used to provide an orderly and fair means of assigning nonstandard duties.

classes should provide information on the procedures and standards for AR 15-6 investigations, including how to tie findings of fact into recommendations and conclusions. Potential IOs should understand that timely and thorough completion of directed investigations is an IO responsibility. The BOLT's role is to focus appointed IOs on both the legal requirements and timely completion of investigations.

Analysis

The training objective behind the investigation requirement is not merely for the IO and the BOLT to manage investigations, but to raise the brigade's awareness and incorporate the lessons from these investigations into subsequent operations. While identifying systemic causes of fratricides and serious incidents is not a legal function, the BOLT is the best-positioned staff section to do so because it reviews every investigation. The BOLT can facilitate this process by specifically tasking the IO in the appointing order to identify contributing factors to the fratricide.

For example, at the JRTC, small arms engagements across companies resulting in fratricide are often caused by the lack of a clear understanding of the unit boundaries and the failure to coordinate with the adjacent unit. When IOs identify such factors in their investigations, the BOLT should ensure that the brigade commander and staff receive this information before the next mission. By focusing the fratricide investigation, analyzing the investigation's results, and educating brigade leaders on the IO's findings, the BOLT contributes directly to the protection of combat power.³⁰

Law of War Training

A separate but related challenge for the BOLT involves the brigade's adherence to the Law of War (LOW). Pre-deployment LOW training can minimize concern over this issue. All soldiers and officers receive basic LOW training ("The Soldiers' Rules") upon entry on active duty.³¹ Refresher LOW training conducted within the units should adapt the LOW principles to the unit's current mission and contingency plans.³²

A JRTC rotation exercises the practical application of LOW principles. While soldiers know that they should not execute or torture enemy prisoners of war (EPW), units rotating through the JRTC consistently demonstrate the need for refined LOW

training before deployment. Consider the following examples of rotational unit conduct observed during JRTC rotations:

- The brigade staff positions a dislocated civilian collection point adjacent to an artillery battery immediately prior to the brigade's conduct of defensive operations;
- A company commander evicts a suspected enemy sympathizer from her home to establish a command post and destroys all furnishings and decorations within;
- Following an engagement, a company commander prioritizes two of his own "routine/walking wounded" casualties aboard an air medevac helicopter ahead of two enemy "litter-urgent" EPW casualties, who are left behind to die from their wounds;
- A brigade sniper is transported to hide sites around the battlefield in a field ambulance;
- A stinger air-defense team positions itself atop the town hospital; and
- Numerous EPWs are placed under the supervision of the counterintelligence team, which places them within a 10' x 10' area surrounded by concertina wire that is in the direct sunlight and denies them water to make them "more willing to talk."

This list is typical of the LOW issues that plague rotational units at some point during a rotation. Notably, neither the JRTC O/Cs or role-play staff drives these issues; they all arise from the brigade members' own decisions.

A solid brigade pre-deployment training plan may begin with generic LOW briefings but should not end there. Like ROE, LOW principles are applied best in STX lanes and FTXs, however, LOW STX lanes are difficult to design without a dedicated opposing force, role-playing civilians, and a developed training area infrastructure. Accordingly, the BOLT must supplement briefings with vignette training and follow-on discussion to encompass some of the less dramatic but equally troubling situations described above.³³ As these examples make clear, the BOLT must ensure that soldiers and leaders alike receive this training.

Finally, the BOLT must maintain visibility on all operational planning to protect brigade leaders from inadvertently violating the LOW and to report outright LOW violations.³⁴ The TTP to

30. FM 3-0, *supra* note 18, ch. 4.

31. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 350-41, TRAINING IN UNITS ch. 14 (19 Mar. 1993).

32. *Id.*

33. Sample LOW training presentations are available on-line at www.jagcnet.army.mil/CLAMO-WarCrimes. Vignettes and other training devices may be found in the OPLAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 3, the INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK (June 2000), and online at www.jagcnet.army.mil/CLAMO-training.

counter these reporting challenges mirror those relating to fratricides and serious incident reporting discussed previously.

Law of War matters are often paid lip service by brigade leaders, under the assumption that a good soldier intuitively understands the line between criminal and lawful acts. The LOW, however, raises issues that conflict or appear to conflict with mission accomplishment, such as the duty to evacuate friendly and enemy casualties in triage order, as opposed to all friendly casualties first. Brigades must not neglect LOW training during pre-deployment preparations, and the BOLT should ensure that the training addresses the “gray areas” of LOW combatant obligations not rising to the level of willful criminal acts.

Conclusion

Legal preparation of a brigade for deployment to a Combat Training Center (CTC) is a comprehensive process involving multiple issues across the core legal disciplines. The three subjects discussed in this note routinely cause an inordinate amount of angst that the BOLT can avoid if they address them in a solid pre-deployment training plan. Moreover, the BOLT and the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) must contend with the many legal assistance, claims, and administrative and civil law matters involved in moving 4,000 plus soldiers and their equipment hundreds or thousands of miles away from home for an extended period. The TTP and lessons learned for these issues may be found in the various publications from the

CLAMO and the International and Operational Law Department at The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, most notably the Operational Law Handbook.³⁵ Judge Advocates and legal specialists should study these issues at length before a rotation to ensure proper planning and preparation for the brigade’s train-up and subsequent deployment.

The CLAMO examines legal issues that arise during all phases of military operations and devises training and resource strategies for addressing those issues. This series of CLAMO Notes has posited the framework for a BOLT training plan in preparation for a JRTC deployment. The specific subject areas discussed in each of the four notes are those that regularly challenge BOLTs, based upon the observations and experiences of the O/Cs at the JRTC at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The JRTC OPLAW O/C Team recommends that BOLT and OSJA leaders draft and implement short and long-range BOLT training plans to incorporate the principles discussed in these notes, positioning BOLTs to provide better legal advice and services to commanders throughout their brigade. The JRTC OPLAW O/C Team.

The Center extends its sincere appreciation to the current and former JRTC OPLAW O/C Team for producing this superb four-part series on Preparation Tips for BOLTs deploying to the JRTC.

For more information on the JRTC, or to contact the JRTC OPLAW O/C Team, see the CLAMO’s “Combat Training Centers” database at www.jagcnet.army.mil/CLAMO-CTCs.

34. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM para. 4.3-4.4 (9 Dec. 1998).

35. OPLAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 3.