The Army must change; this is a strategic and fiscal reality.¹

I. Introduction

The Army’s mission is changing. In his October 2013 release of strategic priorities, Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno directed that our leaders begin the process of transitioning from an Army fully engaged in counterinsurgency in the Middle East to an Army poised and ready to face our nation’s next conflict.² As part of his overall strategy, General Odierno wants to ensure our Army maintains a posture as a globally engaged, regionally aligned force.³ As a result, our units will develop relationships, build trust, and expand the military capability of our allied forces.⁴

The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan involved building the capacity of and training host nation forces, while simultaneously staying off a complicated enemy employing insurgent tactics—not an ideal scenario in which to successfully train allied forces. In contrast, the implied vision of our Chief of Staff is to develop an international community of allied forces fully capable of responding to local crises.⁵ This strategy avoids the complications associated with training foreign forces while fighting an enemy and allows the United States to assume more of a supporting role in responding to regional crises.

To meet General Odierno’s goal of producing a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army, judge advocates (JAs) must be prepared to advise commanders who are seeking how best to implement this mission within the context of our reduced budgets and fiscal austerity. The key areas of concern for JAs are the authorities and sources of funding that exist to allow commanders to conduct foreign assistance missions, namely, security assistance missions that build the capacity of foreign allied forces (sometimes colloquially referred to as “big t” training).

Before 2014, commanders of general purpose forces—forces not falling under the authority of the U.S. Special Operations Command—were only permitted to conduct security assistance with foreign forces in two circumstances:⁶ (1) interoperability training; or (2) certain limited authorities that allowed some training of foreign forces, so long as the training was narrowly tailored through either a focus on a specific geographic area or training objectives that concentrated only on certain capabilities of the foreign force.⁷ Congress broadened the authority to train

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² See supra note 1.

³ Id.

⁴ Id. In his command distribution, General Odierno specifically stated that to become a regionally engaged force, our Army must “shape and set theaters for regional commanders employing unique Total Army characteristics and capabilities to influence the security environment, build trust, develop relationships, and gain access through rotational forces, multilateral exercises mil-to-mil engagements, coalition training, and other opportunities.” Id. at 6.

⁵ Id. General Odierno lists several directives related to the objective of being a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army (e.g., shaping and setting theaters, influencing the security environment, deepening regional understanding, protecting interests of our Allies, and leading multinational task forces). Id. at 4–6. Though not specifically stated within his strategic priorities, these directives juxtaposed with the reduction of the Army’s end strength and funding, plainly imply that we are going to work with our allies to increase their capacity to respond to local threats.

⁶ The phrase “general purposes forces” is a term specifically used by Congress in the text of section 1203 of the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. This term distinguishes conventional forces from special operations forces that already possessed statutory authority permitting them to train with friendly foreign forces. This distinction is specifically discussed in Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) legislative proposal to Congress requesting the new authority for conventional forces. See Legislative Proposal for Inclusion in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 from Dept. of Def. Office of Legislative Counsel, to Congress (May 15, 2013) [hereinafter Legislative Proposal] (on file with author).


⁸ For an example of when Congress provided the DoD with the authority to conduct security assistance training in a specific geographic area, see 10 U.S.C. § 1050 (2012), which permits the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of a military department to pay for certain expenses relating to the training and development of militaries in Latin American countries. For an example of when Congress provided the DoD with the authority to conduct security assistance for limited training objectives, see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1206, 119 Stat. 3456–57 (2006), which allowed DoD to train foreign forces, but limited that training to preparing foreign militaries to conduct countterterrorist operations or support U.S. forces in stability operations in which the U.S. forces are a participant.
foreign military forces with a change in the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This change reflects a shift in our national strategy from a military at war in the Middle East to a military restructuring and projecting its influence globally among our allies. To assist JAs in advising commanders on the authority to train foreign forces, this article first describes the previous limitations Congress placed upon the Department of Defense (DoD) when conducting foreign assistance. The article next describes the new broader training authority contained in the 2014 NDAA that changes the way the DoD can conduct security assistance in the future by allowing general purpose force commanders to provide security assistance training to foreign military forces.

II. Historical Limitations on “Big T” Training

In 1961, Congress reorganized and defined the roles and responsibilities of the Department of State (DoS) via the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). This act identified the DoS as the lead agency for all foreign assistance activities. Therefore, and as a general rule, the DoD does not have the authority to conduct foreign assistance missions. There are, however, two main exceptions that permit the DoD to conduct foreign assistance in limited circumstances: (1) interoperability training, which is sometimes referred to as “little t” training; and (2) express statutory authority.

A. “Little t” Training

In Nicaragua in 1979, the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FLSN), a guerrilla movement with ties to the Soviet Union, overthrew the sitting Nicaraguan dictator, General Anastasio Smoza De Bayle. Due to a concern over possible communist expansion by the FLSN movement into Honduras, U.S. forces began to conduct readiness exercises with the Honduran military in February 1983. The initial exercise, named Operation Big Pine, consisted of 1,600 U.S. troops and 4,000 Honduran military members with the objectives of improving deployment procedures and logistical support. In Operation Big Pine II, the next iteration of the exercise that began in August 1983, the U.S. presence grew to over 5,000 U.S. ground forces and accompanying air and naval support conducting a myriad of activities in Honduras. Congress, concerned with the national strategic implications of a military build-up along the Honduras–Nicaragua border, requested a comptroller general investigation into the validity of the military’s funding authority to conduct such an expansive operation. Through its investigation and resulting opinion, the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified a circumstance when the U.S. military forces have the authority to use their operations and maintenance (O&M) funds to conduct security assistance training with foreign forces for the purposes of interoperability, safety, and familiarization: “little t” training.

The GAO investigation revealed that U.S. forces were furnishing training to the Honduran military in the form of: (1) combat medical training; and (2) artillery training on 105mm artillery pieces acquired by Honduras through the Foreign Military Sales program. The GAO determined that these training activities constituted security assistance and were not properly funded by the standard DoD O&M accounts. By way of distinction, however, the GAO

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12 Id.

13 COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 53 (Robert Wesson ed. 1982); see also THOMAS M. LEONARD, THE HISTORY OF HONDURAS 156 (Greenwood Publishing Group 2011).

14 LEONARD, supra note 13, at 156–58.
indicated that it is appropriate for U.S. forces to provide training to foreign military forces in certain limited circumstances:

Whenever combined military exercises are conducted, it is natural (and indeed desirable) that there be a transfer of information and skills between the armed forces of the participating countries. In addition, where there is a marked disparity of military sophistication between the two nations’ armed forces, it is not surprising that this transfer is principally in one direction, i.e., to the benefit of the less-developed military force. In addition, as emphasized by the Defense Department, some degree of familiarization and safety instruction is necessary before combined-forces activities are undertaken, in order to ensure “interoperability” of the two forces.

At the same time, where familiarization and safety instruction prior to combined exercises rise to a level of formal training comparable to that normally provided by security assistance projects, it is our view that those activities fall within the scope of security assistance, for which comprehensive legislative programs (and specific appropriation categories) have been established by the Congress.22

Therefore, general purpose force commanders can perform limited interoperability, safety, and familiarization training with a foreign force for the purpose of preparing for combined military operations.23 However, this level of training will not be sufficient authority for commanders to fully respond to the new challenge of becoming a globally responsive and regionally aligned military. Although “little t” training authority is a valid and useful means of training foreign forces, commanders will need authority that allows them to train and develop the capacity of foreign forces well beyond the minimal interoperability training contemplated by the GAO’s “little t” training exception.

B. Express Statutory Authority

Aside from the above listed “little t” training exception that allows the DoD to conduct a minor amount of training with foreign forces, the only other time that U.S. forces can conduct security assistance training is when Congress provides express statutory authority. Prior to the 2014 NDAA, Congress only provided general purpose forces with the authority to conduct specialized training missions focusing on a specific geographic area, a specific training objective, or both.24 Without additional statutory authority, our commanders cannot extensively train with allied forces to achieve the Chief of Staff’s goal of becoming a globally responsive regionally aligned force. Recognizing this critical gap in authority, DoD leaders specifically requested that Congress augment our existing limited security assistance authorities with a broader authority that would permit our general purpose forces to train more comprehensively with friendly foreign forces.25 Congress obliged our military with such authority in the 2014 NDAA.26

III. New Security Assistance Authority—§1203 of the 2014 NDAA

The 2014 NDAA affords general purpose commanders a new authority to conduct training with friendly foreign forces. In relevant part, § 1203 of the 2014 NDAA provides that “general purpose forces of the United States Armed Forces may train with the military forces or other security forces of a friendly foreign country if the Secretary of Defense determines that it is in the national security interests of the United States to do so.”27 In addition, Congress also provided military commanders with the authority to pay for “the incremental expenses incurred by a friendly foreign country as the direct result of training with the general purpose forces of the United States.”28 Unlike previous grants of authority from Congress, the general purpose forces training authority (GPTA) does not limit commanders

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22 Hon. Bill Alexander, 63 Comp. Gen. at 441.

23 Id. For example, the “little t” training exception would allow U.S. forces preparing to conduct a combined live-fire training exercise with a foreign allied force to provide training to the foreign force on the safety procedures to follow during the exercise to ensure the safety and interoperability of both forces.

24 See supra note 6 (discussing Congress’s previous limitations on grants of authority for DoD to conduct security assistance).

25 The DoD Office of Legislative Counsel submitted a legislative proposal to the Senate Armed Service committee requesting an authority for general purpose forces to conduct training with friendly foreign forces. In this request, the DoD identified a need to maintain and enhance the skills developed by U.S. forces in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan—namely the ability to train foreign forces in an effort to prepare for and prevent future conflicts. Further, the DoD informed Congress that, without this new authority, general purpose forces would be limited in their ability to train with and develop relationships with foreign allied forces. See Legislative Proposal, supra note 6.


27 Id.

28 Id.
to training with foreign forces in specific geographic areas or require a specific training objective.²⁹

Though the intended purpose of this authority is to provide general purpose forces with the opportunity to improve the skills required to train a foreign force during a future counterinsurgency, this training can and will have the dual benefit of improving U.S. military relationships with and the military capacity of allied forces.³⁰ The ability to engage in this type of “big t” training is precisely the authority commanders need to meet the Chief of Staff’s mission of becoming a globally responsive, regionally engaged military. Judge advocates advising commanders to utilize GPTA to conduct foreign assistance missions should consider the following special characteristics of this authority: (1) the requirement that training improve the mission essential tasks of U.S. forces; (2) the interplay between the DoD and DoS in providing training under this authority; (3) congressional reporting requirements; and (4) the limitation on incremental expenses.

A. Focus on Training of U.S. Forces

The specific language contained within GPTA requires the training to “support the mission essential tasks for which the training unit providing such training is responsible [and to] be with a foreign unit or organization with equipment that is functionally similar to such training unit.” Therefore, by way of example, the commander of a U.S. infantry unit can train an allied foreign military unit so long as the training promotes the U.S. unit’s mission essential tasks—infantry tasks—and the foreign unit being trained is a maneuver unit with similar organization and equipment.

Therefore, JAs advising commanders on employing GPTA for future missions should work closely with the staff during the military decision making and planning process to ensure that any recommended course of action is closely tied to the unit’s mission essential task list.³¹ So long as there is a nexus with the unit’s essential tasks, U.S. forces can seek to train a friendly foreign force in a way that both builds the capacity of and strengthens the relationship with the allied force.

³⁴ See DoD 5105.38-M supra note 11; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 12-15, JOINT SECURITY COOPERATION EDUCATION AND TRAINING (3 Jan. 2011) [hereinafter AR 12-15].
³⁵ AR 12-15, supra note 34, para. 3-2.
³⁶ DoD 5105.38-M, supra note 11, para. 10.17.11.
training events should look for the publication\textsuperscript{37} of more specific regulations on the topic to better inform their commanders of the proper procedures for executing any such training.\textsuperscript{38}

C. Congressional Reporting Requirements

The grant of GPTA comes with a considerable amount of congressional oversight. At least fifteen days prior to commencing any training activity under this authority, the Secretary of Defense must send notice to the House and Senate Armed Service Committees.\textsuperscript{39} Additionally, Congress requires an annual detailed report on the use of GPTA, which will include a detailed description of any training activities conducted pursuant to GPTA, as well as a projection of future plans to conduct GPTA training exercises. The JCET program listed above has similar reporting requirements.

In 1999, the GAO conducted a comprehensive review of the special operations JCET program, which included a review and significant scrutiny of the congressional reporting requirements.\textsuperscript{40} Though the GAO report on JCETs provides several areas that fell short in the congressional reporting process, one focus area from the GAO report that commanders at all levels can influence, and one that should be of particular interest to advising JAs, is accounting for the costs associated with training missions.\textsuperscript{41} The GAO report identifies the primary challenge to calculating and reporting JCET costs to Congress is a function of the special operations command’s use of various appropriations to fund the JCETs, which includes defense wide O&M, service O&M, and combatant command O&M.\textsuperscript{42} In particular, the report mentions that the DoD should have selected one appropriation to fund the JCET expenses and continued to use only that appropriation for the entirety of the fiscal year.\textsuperscript{43} Based on the lessons learned from the JCET reporting procedures, JAs should take the following steps to ensure proper cost accounting for GPTA activities:

1. Work with their commanders and staffs to obtain clear guidance on which appropriation is proper for funding GPTA;

2. Certify that only the selected appropriation is used for all GPTA; and

3. Make sure that the resource manager is accurately accounting for these expenses for inclusion in the required congressional report on GPTA expenses.

D. Limitation on Incremental Expenses

Congress, in authorizing general purpose forces to train friendly foreign forces, recognized the potential need to provide funding for some foreign allies who do not have the ability to pay for expenses related to training with U.S. forces. Congress, therefore, authorized the payment of incremental expenses “incurred as a direct result of training with general purpose forces of the United States Armed Forces.”\textsuperscript{44} Unlike the JCET program, however, Congress placed a cap on the total amount of expenses that are permissible under the GPTA at $10 million.\textsuperscript{45} As a result of this limitation, JAs should work in coordination with their staffs to first determine whether

\textsuperscript{37} Judge advocates should look to the DoD Issuances website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ for initial regulatory guidance on the implementation of general purpose forces training authority (GPTA). Also, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) serves as DoD’s lead agency on security assistance programs. In that capacity, DSCA may also have some initial guidance on GPTA that judge advocates may find useful when planning training activities under this new authority. DSCA publishes guidance and information on its website at http://www.dscal.gov/.\textsuperscript{38} National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1203(f) (2014). In section 1203 of the NDAA, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to publish regulations governing the conduct of training pursuant to this authority no later than 180 days after the enactment of the 2014 NDAA, or 26 June 2014. Based upon the traditional process of implementing regulations from DoD down to the service level, it is unclear when specific guidance on this authority will be available to practitioners. Consequently, it is important that JAs begin analyzing this statute to be in a position to rapidly advise commanders as the cascade of guidance regulations begins to work their way from the DoD level down to each specific service.\textsuperscript{39} National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 § 1203(d).\textsuperscript{40} See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-99-173, MILITARY TRAINING: MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING (1999), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-173. This GAO report provides a comprehensive review of the JCET process from a congressional oversight perspective. In particular, the report focuses on how JCETs are properly focused on training U.S. Forces, the congressional reporting requirements, the level of oversight required to ensure JCETs are consistent with foreign policy, and the prevention of human rights abuses by foreign forces. This report is a good resource for JAs as they attempt to analyze the requirements and limitations of section 2013 of the 2014 NDAA.\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 32.\textsuperscript{42} Id. at 37. In each year’s appropriation act, Congress provides separate O&M appropriations for each separate service and one for DoD-wide expenditures; each Combatant Command requests annual O&M funding from the DoD based upon their budget. Each appropriation is to be used for the specific expenses related to operating and maintaining for the specified entity.\textsuperscript{43} Id. at 38; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW ch. 2, pt. B, sec. 2, at 2-23 (3rd ed. 2004 & Supp. 2013).\textsuperscript{44} National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 § 1203(c)(1). Examples of incremental expenses are food, fuel, training ammunition, transportation, and other goods and services a friendly foreign country incurred as a direct result of participating in combined training events with U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{45} Id. § 1203(c)(2). The congressional limitation applies to DoD-wide incremental expenses paid to any friendly foreign force in a given fiscal year.
the allied foreign force is one from a developing country that would require payment of incremental expenses. Then, if some incremental expenses are required to successfully complete the training mission, JAs should coordinate with members of the chain of command and technical chain to determine whether their particular training exercise has sufficient priority across the DoD to prevent any commitment of incremental expenses in excess of the congressional limitation.

The new GPTA authority is certainly something commanders will want to leverage as they prepare to meet the requirements of developing our foreign allies in preparation for any future conflicts. Judge advocates need to be aware of the limitations of this authority in an effort to provide comprehensive advice to commanders operating in this new operational environment.

IV. Conclusion

Changing the Army’s mission from supporting the counterinsurgencies in the Middle East to developing relationships with and building the capacity of foreign allied forces during a time of limited fiscal resources will be a significant challenge to our leaders. Congress, through section 1203 of the 2014 NDAA, provided our commanders with a substantial increase in foreign assistance authority required to meet the objectives of becoming a globally responsive, regionally aligned force. Though this new “big t” training authority will require specific guidance and direction from our leaders at the DoD, JAs should advise their commanders on both the utility and limitations on this authority as our units plan for future exercises with foreign allied forces. The approval to use these funds will likely be held at a high level; however, JAs can make their commanders aware of this authority by shaping any security assistance training plan to conform to the requirements of section 1203 of the 2014 NDAA.