IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES, Appellee	**BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE**
v.	Docket No. ARMY 20240105
Specialist (E-4) **ARMSTRONG ONYENSO**, United States Army, Appellant	Tried at Fort Carson, Colorado, on 17 January and 6 March 2024 before a general court-martial appointed by the Commander, Headquarters, Fort Carson, Colonel Jacqueline L. Emanuel, military judge, presiding.

TO THE HONORABLE, THE JUDGES OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Assignments of Error[1]

I.

WHETHER THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE, SPECIFICALLY THE ADJUDGED BAD-CONDUCT DISCHARGE, SHOULD BE APPROVED.

II.

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL AN EXPERT CONSULTANT IN FORENSIC NEUROPSYCHOLOGY.

[1] The government has reviewed the matters submitted by appellant pursuant to *United States v. Grostefon*, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), and respectfully submits that they lack merit. Should the Court consider any of those matters meritorious, the government requests notice and an opportunity to file a supplemental brief addressing the claimed error.

Panel No. 4

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Statement of the Case

On 6 March 2024, a military judge sitting as a general court-martial found appellant guilty, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of attempted sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Article 80, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2018) [UCMJ]; and one specification of resisting apprehension, in violation of Article 87a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 887a (2018). (Amended Statement of Trial Results [Amended STR]).

Consistent with appellant's plea agreement (App. Ex. XVIII, XIV), the military judge sentenced appellant to a total of 90 days of confinement, reduction to the grade of E-1, and a bad-conduct discharge. (Amended STR; R. at 155). In the military judge's original Statement of Trial Results, completed on 7 March 2024, she recommended that appellant be administratively discharged notwithstanding the binding nature of the plea agreement. (Statement of Trial Results). In the Amended Statement of Trial Results completed on 11 June 2024, the military judge further recommended suspension of the bad-conduct discharge. (Amended STR).

On 2 July 2024, the convening authority disapproved the military judge's suspension recommendation and took no additional action. (Action).[2] The

[2] In a memorandum for record attached to the Action, the convening authority documented that he had considered the military judge's recommendation. (Action).

military judge entered judgment on 8 July 2024. (Judgment).

Statement of Facts

This case arose from a sting operation conducted by the Army Criminal Investigative Command [CID] and Homeland Security Investigations of the Department of Homeland Security. On 18 March 2023, appellant responded to an advertisement on the escort website "skipthegames.com" offering sexual acts in exchange for money from an adult "service provider" who purported to be 19 years old. (Pros. Ex. 1 at 2; R. at 92). The "service provider" was, in fact, an undercover CID agent. (Pros. Ex. 1 at 2).

Appellant responded to the advertisement by texting the undercover agent. (R. at 75; Pros. Ex. 4 at 1). The undercover agent told appellant, "im 14 almost 15, hope ur ok with [that]. (Pros. Ex. 4 at 1). Appellant's initial response was, "Yeah… you at your parents place?" (Pros. Ex. 4 at 1). Appellant and the undercover agent then discussed whether appellant could get onto Fort Carson to meet, before appellant wrote, "Yeah sorry I cant do this." (Pros. Ex. 4 at 1).

Approximately five minutes later, appellant texted the undercover agent again, saying that he had been "a little hasty," and appellant reengaged in planning a meeting on Fort Carson. (Pros. Ex. 1 at 2; Pros. Ex. 4 at 1).[3] The undercover

[3] Prosecution Exhibit 4 shows the text messages appellant exchanged with the

agent asked appellant whether he had condoms and what he was looking for; appellant responded that he did have condoms and said, "I want to go all the way." (Pros. Ex. 4 at 1). Appellant then agreed on a price and began traveling to Fort Carson. (Pros. Ex. 4 at 1; Pros. Ex. 1 at 2).[4]

When appellant got to the address he'd been given by the undercover agent, he entered the residence and was confronted by CID agents, who identified themselves as police. (Pros. Ex. 1 at 2). Appellant resisted the agents' efforts to detain him, pulling away from them and, while on the ground, putting his arms under his chest to avoid being handcuffed. (Pros. Ex. 1 at 2).

Based on appellant's guilty plea, the maximum punishment authorized by law was confinement for 21 years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to the grade of E-1, and a dishonorable discharge. (R. at 108). Pursuant to the plea agreement executed by appellant and his counsel, appellant's punishment was

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undercover agent. At 06:09:49 PM MDT, appellant wrote, "Yeah sorry I cant do this," to which the undercover agent responded, "okay.. bye." No further communication occurred until 06:15:31 PM MDT, when appellant wrote, "Alright so i was a little hasty. Think the better question [is] what do YOU want." (Pros. Ex. 4 at 1).

[4] Appellant testified during providency about his intentions: "My plan when I arrived . . . was to do sexual acts with the female I knew as Emma. I wanted her to touch my penis. I had cash and condoms already in my barracks room, so I brought them with me [and] I made the substantial step of driving to the address on Fort Carson to complete the plan." (R. at 92).

limited to 180 total days of confinement, no fine, reduction to the grade of E-1, and a bad conduct discharge. (App. Ex. XVIII at 4).

Assignment of Error I

WHETHER THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE, SPECIFICALLY THE ADJUDGED BAD-CONDUCT DISCHARGE, SHOULD BE APPROVED.

Standard of Review

Pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ, the Court reviews sentence appropriateness de novo. *See United States v. Kelly*, 77 M.J. 404, 406 (C.A.A.F. 2018); *United States v. Hunter*, 84 M.J. 715, 717 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2024) (citing *Kelly*).

Applicable Law

The Court may affirm "the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as the Court finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved." Art. 66(d)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1) (2018).[5] The Court "has discretion to approve only that part of a sentence that it finds should be approved, even if the sentence is correct as a matter of law." *Hunter*, 84 M.J. at 718 (quoting *Kelly*, 77 M.J. at 406) (additional citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When determining whether a sentence should be

[5] Because appellant's offenses occurred prior to 27 December 2023, the Court should apply the version of Article 66, UCMJ in effect prior to the amendments enacted by Congress in 2021. *See* National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, §539E, 135 Stat. 1541, 1700-06 (2021); *Hunter*, 84 M.J. at 718 n.3.

approved, the Court considers both legality and appropriateness, taking into account individualized consideration of the appellant, the nature and seriousness of the offense, and the character of the offender. *See United States v. Lopez-Garcia*, No. ARMY 20220590, 2023 CCA LEXIS 441, at *5-6 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 18 Oct. 2023) (citations omitted). An accused may freely and voluntarily enter into an agreement in order to receive the benefit of a plea agreement, which may include limiting his punitive exposure. *See United States v. Rippy*, __M.J.__, No. ARMY 20230633, slip op. at 8 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 27 Aug. 2025).

Argument

The Court should reject appellant's request for disapproval of the bad-conduct discharge contained in his plea agreement. In asking this Court to undo the plea deal appellant himself made and the convening authority accepted, appellant minimizes the seriousness of his crimes, overstates the nature of the medical evidence in the record, and effectively asks the Court to engage in a prohibited act of clemency.

As an initial matter, appellant downplays the serious nature of his offenses. While appellant focuses on his behavior at the beginning of the sting operation, (Appellant's Br. at 10), he ignores the affirmative steps appellant took toward completing a plan he expected to and intended to result in sexual acts with a minor. Upon learning that the girl he planned to pay for sexual acts was "14 almost 15,"

appellant hesitated for approximately five minutes; after that, he was committed. *See* (Pros. Ex. 4 at 1; R. at 92). Appellant received a price: $175 for one hour. (Pros. Ex. 1 at 2; Pros. Ex. 4 at 1). He went to his barracks room, retrieved money and condoms, and drove to the address given to him by the undercover CID agent, which appellant believed to be the home of the parents of the girl he was planning to meet to engage in sexual acts. (Pros. Ex. 1 at 2). When he entered through the unlocked door, as directed by the undercover agent he believed was a 14-year-old girl, appellant was confronted by several CID agents, who announced themselves as law enforcement. (Pros. Ex. 1 at 2). Appellant resisted apprehension, requiring the efforts of several agents to wrestle him to the ground and handcuff him. (Pros. Ex. 1 at 2; R. at 101).

Appellant admitted that, during all of these events on 18 March 2023, he was capable of understanding the nature and wrongfulness of his actions. (Pros Ex. 1 at 3). He admitted that he could have avoided committing attempted sexual abuse of a child, and that it was his free choice to commit the offense. (R. at 96–97).

In addition, appellant portrays the evidence of his medical issues as far more substantial than what the record reflects. While appellant focuses on several potential symptoms of traumatic brain injury [TBI], *see* (Appellant's Br. at 11), there is no evidence that appellant was ever diagnosed with TBI, despite having

been seen at a clinic focusing on such injuries. *See* (R. at 141).[6] As for symptoms allegedly connected to his injury, in his unsworn statement appellant referred to issues like "headaches, difficulty concentrating, irritability and increased levels of stress." (R. at 141). But the military judge confirmed that appellant *was not* contending that his claimed TBI had left him unable to appreciate the nature of his actions. (R. at 142). Despite suffering from headaches, or even difficulty with "impulse control," Appellant's Br. at 11, appellant admitted that he acted intentionally on 18 March 2023 because he "wanted sexual gratification" from a girl he believed to be 14 years old. (R. at 98).

Finally, by emphasizing the collateral consequences of a bad-conduct discharge—impact on appellant's "legal rights, economic opportunities, . . . status within society" and potential veterans' benefits—appellant, in essence, asks the Court to supplant the convening authority's role and grant clemency. *See* (Appellant's Br. at 12). Moreover, appellant now asks this Court to ignore the fact that he freely and voluntarily entered into a plea agreement to reduce his punitive exposure. Appellant received the benefit of his plea agreement and now seeks additional clemency beyond his bargain. Focusing, as it must, on whether

[6] Although the military judge at times used the term "traumatic brain injury" to describe appellant's injury, she noted that it was not a diagnosis. *See, e.g.*, (Amended STR) (referring to "traumatic brain injury referenced to in [appellant's] unsworn statement").

appellant's sentence "should be approved," based upon individualized consideration of appellant and his character, as well as the nature and seriousness of the offenses, the Court should approve the sentence adjudged.

Assignment of Error II

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL AN EXPERT CONSULTANT IN FORENSIC NEUROPSYCHOLOGY.

Standard of Review

The Court reviews a military judge's ruling on a request for expert assistance for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Lloyd*, 69 M.J. 95, 99 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing *United States v. Bresnahan*, 62 M.J. 137, 143 (C.A.A.F. 2005)). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous or if the court's decision is influenced by an erroneous view of the law." *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Freeman*, 65 M.J. 451, 453 (C.A.A.F. 2008)). While "each case turns on its own facts," *Bresnahan*, 62 M.J. at 143, the CAAF has characterized this standard as "strict," requiring "more than a mere difference of opinion. The challenged action must be "'arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable,' or 'clearly erroneous.'" *Lloyd*, 69 M.J. at 99 (quoting *United States v. McElhaney*, 54 M.J. 120, 130 (C.A.A.F. 2000)) (additional citations and quotation marks omitted).

Additional Facts

On 16 October 2023, appellant submitted requests for two expert consultants: a forensic psychologist and a forensic neuropsychologist. (App. Ex. IV-A; App. Ex. V-A). The convening authority denied both requests on 26 October 2023 (App. Ex. IV-B; App. Ex. V-B), and appellant moved to compel their appointment on 1 November 2023. (App. Ex. IV; App. Ex. V). The government responded on 6 November 2023 (App. Ex. VI; App. Ex. VII), and on 9 November 2023, the military judge heard testimony from appellant's proposed experts (R. at 21–37) and argument on the motions. (R. at 38–54).

In appellant's motion to compel appointment of a forensic neuropsychologist, he argued to the military judge that such an expert was needed to conduct testing on appellant, evaluate the impact of his claimed traumatic brain injury, assist the defense with trial preparation, and potentially testify as an expert witness. *See* (App. Ex. V at 3). Appellant's motion to compel appointment of a forensic psychologist was similar, arguing that an expert was needed to conduct testing, "evaluate SPC Onyenso's likelihood of reoffending if convicted, and to provide potential mitigating evidence on behalf of SPC Onyenso, assist the defense with trial preparation, and potentially testify as an expert witness." *See* (App. Ex.

IV at 3).[7]

During argument on the motions, appellant's counsel narrowed the request for a forensic psychologist to focus on sentencing in the event of conviction. (R. at 45) (". . . I think the main focus of her assistance is in sentencing."). With the motion so narrowed, the government withdrew its opposition to the motion. (R. at 50–51). Also during argument, defense counsel introduced an affidavit from appellant recounting the effects of an injury appellant suffered during a training jump in May 2022 and his efforts to seek treatment for that injury (App. Ex. V-C), and trial counsel introduced a Report of Mental Status Evaluation showing that appellant had been evaluated for traumatic brain injury and other issues by a licensed clinical social worker, who determined that appellant met the behavioral health standards for retention and that he understood the difference between right and wrong. (App. Ex. VI-A at 1–2).

The military judge granted appellant's motion to compel appointment of a forensic psychologist solely for the purpose of assessing appellant's potential for recidivism. (R. at 54–55). Finding, however, that appellant had failed to show "more than a mere possibility of assistance," the military judge denied the motion

[7] Appellant also argued that he needed to retain a forensic psychologist to refute the trial testimony of the government's expert. *See* (App. Ex. IV at 3). As noted in its opposition, however, the government had not retained or noticed an expert. *See* (App. Ex. VII at 4).

to compel appointment of a forensic psychologist with respect to the merits of the case. (R. at 54).

The military judge denied, in full, appellant's motion to compel appointment of a forensic neuropsychologist, finding that appellant had failed "to establish necessity under the *Gonzalez* analysis." (R. at 55). The military judge explained her ruling as follows:

> All the defense has shown is that there is a possibility of assistance from [the forensic neuropsychologist]. There is conjecture about whether this impacted, how this impacted, how the brain injury, the fall where he hit his head, has impacted Specialist Onyenso. And so in nothing that the defense presented in evidence here today establishes more than the mere possibility of assistance from [the forensic neuropsychologist].

(R. at 55).[8]

Applicable Law

Soldiers are entitled to government-provided expert assistance if such assistance is necessary to their defense. *United States v. Freeman*, 65 M.J. 451, 458 (C.A.A.F. 2008). Establishing necessity requires "demonstrate[ing] something more than a mere possibility of assistance from a requested expert . . . ." *United*

[8] Beyond this statement regarding "conjecture," and contrary to appellant's contention on appeal, *see* (Appellant's Br. at 14) the military judge made no finding regarding appellant's claim to have suffered a mild or moderate traumatic brain injury, and no finding regarding appellant's symptoms. *See, e.g.*, (R. at 54–55).

States v. Gunkle, 55 M.J. 26, 31 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting *United States v. Robinson*, 39 M.J. 88, 89 (C.M.A. 1994)) (additional citations omitted). "[T]he accused has the burden of establishing that a reasonable probability exists that (1) an expert would be of assistance to the defense and (2) that denial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial." *Lloyd*, 69 M.J. at 99 (quoting *Freeman*, 65 M.J. at 458).

The Court applies the three-part test set forth in *United States v. Gonzalez*, 39 M.J. 459, 461 (C.M.A. 1994), to determine whether expert assistance is necessary. "The defense must show (1) why the expert is necessary; (2) what the expert would accomplish for the accused; and (3) why defense counsel is unable to gather and present the evidence that the expert would be able to develop." *Lloyd*, 69 M.J. at 99 (citation omitted). If the Court finds an abuse of discretion, it must then determine whether the error materially prejudiced appellant's substantial rights. *United States v. Lee*, 64 M.J. 213, 218 (C.A.A.F. 2006). "Where denial of an expert deprives an appellant of the right to present a defense to the 'linchpin of the prosecution case,' the error takes on a constitutional dimension and must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to avoid reversal." *United States v. Hedgecock*, 80 M.J. 509, 515 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2020) (quoting *United States v.*

McAllister, 64 M.J. 248, 252 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (*McAllister IV*)).[9]

Argument

The Court should reject appellant's claim of abuse of discretion by the military judge. Appellant has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate "clearly erroneous" findings of fact or any decision by the military judge "influenced by an erroneous view of the law." *Lloyd*, 69 M.J. at 99. Appellant does not address the *Gonzalez* factors—indeed, appellant's argument does not cite a single precedent—and he has, at best, identified a "mere difference of opinion," which cannot form the basis of the relief sought. *Id.*

Without addressing necessity directly, appellant argues that the military judge abused her discretion because she did not make "detailed" findings of fact

[9] Relying on a partial quotation from *McAllister IV*, appellant incorrectly advises the Court that it must conduct a constitutional error analysis if it determines that appellant has met his burden of showing necessity. *See* (Appellant's Br. at 17). As the CAAF has explained, however, *McAllister IV* "dealt with the issue of prejudice, not whether the military judge erred in denying expert assistance, which was addressed in *McAllister I*." *Lloyd*, 69 M.J. 95, 100 n.7. Moreover, even *McAllister I* does not help appellant, as the issue there was not necessity, but instead whether the military judge had abused her discretion by denying the accused's request for a *particular* expert when there was evidence that the retained expert lacked the necessary competence to assist on "the linchpin of the prosecution case." *United States v. McAllister*, 55 M.J. 270, 275–76 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (*McAllister I*) ("The necessity for expert assistance is not at issue in this case."). *Only then*—after finding error that had the effect of denying the accused the right to present a defense—did the CAAF consider whether the error was constitutional in nature and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. *See McAllister IV*, 64 M.J. at 252.

and inadequately discussed "impulse control" and "brain functions" because attempted sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Article 80, UCMJ, is a specific intent offense. *See* (Appellant's Br. at 17). Despite having voluntarily limited the scope of his motion before the military judge, appellant now also argues that the military judge abused her discretion by directing the government to appoint a forensic psychologist for the limited purpose of assessing appellant's potential for recidivism. *See* (Appellant's Br. at 17–18).[10] Appellant speculates that the military judge's denial of the motions led to a fundamentally unfair trial because consulting a forensic neuropsychologist "may have informed (or changed) the plea negotiations," and because consulting a forensic psychologist could have helped appellant present mitigating evidence that "could have resulted in a lower sentence or affected the convening authority's later determination on granting clemency." (Appellant's Br. at 18–19).

None of appellant's arguments, on appeal or before the military judge, add

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[10] This argument, which is also not included in the text of appellant's assignment of error, was waived before the military judge. (*See* R. at 46–47) ("So we need her here to listen to the testimony in findings and work that into whatever the testing results show *so that she can potentially testify in sentencing* as to how . . . he'll fare with treatment . . . . *Is he going to reoffend or not reoffend?*") (emphasis added). *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Harborth*, __ M.J. __, Nos. 24-0124, 24-0125, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 436, at *10-13 (C.A.A.F. 3 June 2025) (failure to raise evidence suppression issue at trial constituted waiver). However, even if the Court does not find waiver, appellant has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion and any entitlement to relief.

up to necessity, as appellant essentially offers nothing to support the first two *Gonzalez* factors. Rather, just as the military judge found, appellant has, at best, established the "mere possibility" of assistance from the requested experts, both of whom planned to conduct testing to determine whether appellant suffered from a condition that would have impacted his *mens rea* or otherwise mitigated his culpability. *See* (App. Ex. IV; App. Ex. V). This "desire to 'explor[e] all possibilities,' however, does not satisfy the requisite showing of necessity." *Lloyd*, 69 M.J. at 99 (quoting *Bresnahan*, 62 M.J. at 143).[11]

This Court has repeatedly found speculation that an expert *could* have assisted the defense insufficient to demonstrate necessity. *See United States v. Hunt*, No. ARMY 20200158, 2021 CCA LEXIS 457, at *8 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 9 Sep. 2021) (collecting cases). *See also, e.g.*, *United States v. Reynolds*, No. ARMY 20200473, 2022 CCA LEXIS 195, at *11 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 28 Mar. 2022) ("At best, appellant has shown only the 'mere possibility' that [the expert's] appointment to the defense team would have assisted in his defense. This is not enough."); *United States v. Cannon*, 74 M.J. 746, 751 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2015)

[11] On 4 August 2025, appellant moved to attach Defense Appellate Exhibit A, an unsworn declaration from appellant. Nothing in appellant's post-hoc declaration (should the Court grant the motion and consider it) changes the analysis of the *Garcia* factors. Appellant's preference to consult with an expert prior to deciding to plead guilty does not establish the necessity required for this Court to find that the military judge abused her discretion on the motion to compel. *See id.*

("While the defense has offered some suggestions that appellant's confession may have been false (including appellant's self-serving affidavit disavowing his confession), defense counsel ultimately admitted the request for expert assistance was needed to help them determine the voluntariness and trustworthiness of the appellant's confession."). Other service courts have reached the same conclusion in factually similar cases. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Hedgecock*, 80 M.J. 509, 515 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2020) (no abuse of discretion to deny motion for neuropsychologist where proposed expert lacked knowledge of appellant's alleged condition); *United States v. Salas*, No. ACM 37949, 2013 CCA LEXIS 676, at *8 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 6 Aug. 2013) (no abuse of discretion to deny motion for forensic psychologist to evaluate mental state and to explore defenses and "matters of extenuation and mitigation").

In reaching her decision in this case, the military judge applied the same legal framework set forth above, *see* (R. at 54–55), and she made no clearly erroneous factual findings. *See* (R. at 53–55). Accordingly, the military judge acted well within the discretion afforded to her under the law, and appellant's unsupported speculation regarding what might have been does not indicate anything "fundamentally unfair" about the proceedings.

Even assuming error, appellant suffered no material prejudice to a substantial right, and no relief is appropriate. *See United States v. Lee*, 64 M.J.

213, 218 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a) (2006)). The evidence underlying appellant's conviction for attempted sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Article 80, UCMJ, was strong. After appellant first contacted the undercover CID agent online, he had multiple opportunities to turn back and avoid arrest and prosecution. Each time, appellant moved forward, collecting money and condoms, driving onto Fort Carson, and entering the home where he believed he would find an underage girl. *See* (Pros. Ex. 1). In light of such strong, admissible evidence, there can be no reasonable doubt that appellant would have been convicted even if he had had the assistance of one or more expert consultants. *See Hedgecock*, 80 M.J. at 515 ("in light of the evidence adduced at trial . . . we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the members would still have found Appellant had the specific intent to injure [the victim]."[12] Accordingly, the Court should reject appellant's requested relief.

[12] Appellant himself, with the advice of counsel, disclaimed the defenses he now argues he might have asserted if his proposed experts had been retained. *See* Pros. Ex. 1 at 3 (stipulating that appellant "was mentally responsible and competent . . . was fully capable of understanding the nature and wrongfulness of his actions," and "did not have a legal justification or excuse for his actions.").

Conclusion

WHEREFORE, the government respectfully requests this Honorable Court affirm the findings and the sentence in this case.

[redacted]

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

UNITED STATES v. ONYENSO, (20240105)

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent via electronic submission to the Defense Appellate Division at ***usarmy.pentagon.hqda-otjag.mbx.dad-accaservice@army.mil*** on the 2nd day of September, 2025.

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